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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
During recent years the concept of social accounting has received 
widespread attention in accounting literature. The term "social ac-
counting" is used broadly to describe many facets of activities ranging 
from corporate social performance to the evaluation of governmental 
programs involving social problems. This study embraces the term only 
"in the context of measuring and reporting on the impact of a business 
firm upon society and the physical environment."1 
Based on the assumption that a primary purpose for which accounting 
reports are generated is to facilitate decision-making, this study 
examines the impact of one type of social disclosure--corporate environ-
mental disclosure--on stock investment decisions. However, knowing only 
how the statement user reacts to environmental disclosure is not enough. 
Because investor psychology is perceived to be important, the research 
also examines the problem in terms of human information processing 
behavior. Hence, there are two primary objectives of the study: 
(1). To investigate whether corporate environmental disclo-
sure will affect the users' evaluation of the firm. 
(2) To evaluate the effect of environmental disclosure in 
terms of human information processing theory. 
1American Accounting Association Committee on Social Costs, "Report 
of the Committee on Social Costs," The Accounting Review, Supplement to 
Volume XLV (1975), p. 53. 
1 
Social Costs 
Nearly all corporate activities affect society and the surrounding 
environment. Those activities which inflict losses on society--either 
directly or indirectly--are known as external diseconomies or social 
costs. Thus, pollution is a form of social cost. 
Although there are many dimensions to what is commonly referred to 
as the "pollution problem," it is its economic impact that is of sig-
nificance to the accounting profession. In this respect, it has been 
argued that " . • .a contributing factor to pollution is the failure of 
the managerial decision-making process to consider all the costs of 
2 producing and distributing a product." 
Beams and Fertig go so far as to suggest that accountants, by 
their refusal to accept social costs as private cost of doing business, 
are contributing to the deteriorating environment: 
The role of accounting in our current ecological cr1s1s is 
not passive. Accounting provides information upon which 
decisions are made--decisions that result in economic and 
social actions. If the resulting activities disrupt the 
environment then accounti~g is, at least in part, account-
able for that disruption. 
Not everyone agrees with the above viewpoint. For example, 
Paton argues against broadening the scope of accounting to include 
social costs: 
2American Accounting Association Committee on Environmental 
Effects of Organizational Behavior, "Report of the Committee on 
Environmental Effects of Organizational Behavior," The Accounting 
Review, Supplement to Volume XLVIII (1973), p. 76. 
3 Floyd A. Beams and Paul E. Fertig, "Pollution Control Through 
Social Cost Conversion," Journal of Accountancy, CXXXII (November, 
1971)' p. 37. 
2 
I . . . find it difficult to accept the widening of the 
scope of accounting . . . to include responsibility for 
measuring pollution of air, water, and so on, and allo-
cating the 'costs' to particular business entities for 
specific periods. I like to view accounting in fairly 
broad terms, but we can't cover the waterfront, and we 
surely don't ~eserve to be viewed as partners in acts 
of pollution. 
Current Status of Social 
Accounting 
Interest in corporate social accounting has increased signifi-
cantly in the past decade. The American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, the American Accounting Association, and the National 
Association of Accountants have all formed committees and published 
findings on the subject. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) now requires disclo-
sure of the material effec,ts of compliance with governmental environ-
mental protection laws and the Committee on the Environmental Effects 
of Organizational Behavior has suggested that more environmental dis-
closure is needed: "Accountants to date are not adequately disclosing 
environmental information in the financial statements. This is in con-
trast to their avowed support of the principle of full disclosure."5 
While traditionally the SEC has taken the posture that disclosure 
requirements should be limited to those matters having a financial 
effect, during recent years the Natural Resources Defense Council and 
4w. A. Paton, "Pollution Cost," Journal of Accountancy, CXXXIII 
(May, 1972), p. 28. 
5A.A.A.C.E.O.B., "Report of the Committee on Environmental Effects 
of Organizational Behavior," pp. 93-94. 
3 
4 
other public interest groups have challenged the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to broaden disclosure rules to include corporate social 
disclosure. In a suit brought against the SEC by the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Federal Judge Charles Richey ordered the SEC to study 
the issue of social disclosure and to issue social disclosure rules for 
registrants. 6 The issue is still pending; however, the fact that the 
SEC has been forced to consider social disclosure rules suggests that 
nonfinancial social disclosure is almost a certainty in the future. 
In ruling that the SEC consider expanding corporate disclosure to 
nonfinancial matters, Judge Richey stated: 
There are many so-called "ethical investors" in this 
country who want to invest their assets in firms which 
are concerned about the acting on environmental problems 
of the nation. This attitude may be based purely upon 
a concern for the environment; but it may also proceed 
from the recognition that awareness of and sensitivity 
to environm7ntal problems is the mark of intelligent 
management. . 
Evidence tosupport Judge Richey's statement exists. For example, 
several mutual funds, of which the Dreyfus Third Century Fund is the 
largest, have been formed for the purpose of investing in only 
"socially responsible" firms. Occasionally, institutional investors 
have used social criteria in making investment decisions. For example, 
"in 1973 the World Council of Churches liquidated $1.5 million 
6Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 389 F. Supp. 689 (p.D.C., 1974). 
7u. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Act of 
1933 Releast No. 5627 and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release 
No. 11733 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, October 14, 
1975), p. 14. 
(between 30 to 40 percent of its total shareholdings) in British, 
Dutch, and Swiss companies doing business with white-ruled African 
8 
companies." Investor-participants at hearings conducted by the SEC 
on the issue of social disclosure 
suggested a variety of courses through which shareholders 
may influence corporate social behavior, including share-
holder proposals, political action, discussions with 9 
management, refusals to purchase securities, and publicity. 
However, most of the participants indicated they would use social 
information for voting decisions more than for investment decisions. 
Unfortunately, while much has been written on the subject of 
social accounting, little, if any, progress has been made in deter-
mining what information should be disclosed or how to disclose it. 
Moreover, empirical evidence regarding the value of social accounting 
is virtually nonextistent. As is shown in the subsequent section, 
none of the accounting publications have addressed the issue of social 
disclosure in terms of its impact on the behavior of the user. 
Literature Review 
Publications addressing the issue of social accounting may be 
divided into two categories.· The first consists primarily of con-
stitutive definitions of what the role of the accountant in accounting 
8Robert E. Jensen, Phantasmagoric Accounting: Research and 
Analysis of Economic, Social and Environmental Impact of Corporate 
Business (Studies in Accounting Research t/14), (Sarasota, Florida, 
1976),·p. 169. 
5 
9u.S.S.E.C., Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5627 and Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 11733, p. 39. 
6 
for social costs should be. The second category provides limited 
operational definitions and guidelines for social reporting models. 
Constitutive Definitions 
In 1971, the American Accounting Association established a Committee 
on Nonfinancial Measurements of Effectiveness. The committee attempted 
to "search out developments in the area of nonfinancial measures used in 
business or nonbusiness decision-making, suggest their applicability 
to accounting and make recommendations for research projects."10 While 
the committee failed to reach any major conclusions, its primary contri-
butions probably was to lay the groundwork for future committees on 
social accounting. This committee was followed, in 1972, by the 
11 Committee on Measures of Effectiveness for Social Programs. While 
the primary focus of this committee was concerned with the difficulties 
of measuring government social programs, social measurement problems of 
the private sector were also discussed. 
Much of the literature consists of discussions of measurement 
problems. Such problems exist because many of the transactions affec-
ting an accounting system encompassing social costs and benefits are, 
by their very nature, elusive and not subject to the verification 
which accountants have traditionally considered necessary. Because of 
10American Accounting Association Committee on Nonfinancial 
Measures of Effectiveness, "Report of the Committee on Nonfinancial 
Measures of Effectiveness," The Accounting Review, Supplement to 
Volume XLVI (1971), p. 166. 
11Am ' A ' A ' ' C . M f er1can ccount1ng ssoc1at1on omm1ttee on easures o 
Effectiveness for Social Programs, "Report of the Committee on 
Measures of Effectiveness for Social Programs," The Accounting Review, 
Supplement to Volume XLVII (1972). 
7 
the complicated aspects of social measurement, the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants sponsored an interdisciplinary conference 
in 1972 for the purpose of exploring some of the problems of social 
measurement. The conclusions of this group were "social measurement, 
in some form, is desirable," and " •.. there should be more corporate 
disclosures of socially relevant information."12 
The American Accounting Association Committee on Environmental 
Effects of Organizational Behavior expressed a similar point of view: 
The committee believes that accountants have a substantial 
role to play in the external communication of environmental 
effects infqrmation, a significantly greater role than 
they have performed until now.l3 
Nonetheless, because the committee was unable to determine adequate 
measurement techniques to be applied, they concluded that accountants 
should refrain from measuring or attesting to social costs. Instead, 
the committee recommended adequate disclosure of environmental informa-
tion in the financial reports. 
The conclusions of the American Accounting Association Committee 
on the Measurement of Social Costs are similar. Recognizing that 
"social measurements may be qualitative or imprecise,"14 the committee 
concluded there was a need for social reporting by both internal and 
12social Measurement, (New York: American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants, 1972), p. 117. 
13A.A.A.C.E.O.B., "Report of the Committee on Environmental Effects 
of Organizational Behavior," p. 94. 
14Am · A . A . . C . er1can ccount1ng ssoc1at1on o~1ttee 
of Social Costs, "Report of the Committee on the 
Social Costs," The Accounting Review, Supplement 
p. 103. 
on the Measurement 
Measurement of 
to Volume XLIX (1974), 
external decision makers. However, after considering the problems of 
attestation, the committee reasoned that attestation seemed unlikely 
in the near future. 
The American Accounting Association Committee on Social Costs did 
not form any conclusions. Rather the committee reviewed the current 
state of the art of social accounting, described some of the problems 
of incorporating social accounting into the traditional accounting 
15 
system, and examined some measurement problems. 
In 1976, the American Accounting Association Committee on Account-
ing for Social Performance updated the previous committee's survey of 
the state of the art of social accounting. Concluding that "the time 
has come to start paying some attention to social accounting in the 
. . 1 "16 h . . d d . . . account1ng curr1cu urn, t e comm1ttee prov1 e suggest1ons on 1nte-
grating social accounting into the accounting curriculum. Finally, the 
committee recommended accounting research in the area of social 
accounting. 
In addition to sponsoring the above committees, the American 
Accounting Association commissioned Robert E. Jensen to conduct a 
research project concerning social accounting. The resultant study, 
published in 1976, (1) chronicles societal pressures which have 
occurred in recent years and the effect of these pressures in forcing 
private business to assume greater social responsibility, (2) reviews 
15 A.A.A.C.S.C., "Report of the Committee on Social Costs." 
16Am · A . A . . C . A . f er1can ccount1ng ssoc1at1on omm1ttee on ccount1ng or 
Social Performance, "Report of the Committee on Accounting for Social 
Performance," The Accounting Review, Supplement to Volume XLXI (1976), 
p. 66. 
8 
9 
current efforts to report corporate social information, (3) focuses on 
one area of social costs--the impact of pollution--and reviews some of 
the measuring difficulties of recording these social costs, (4) provides 
a checklist of possible criteria which might be used for evaluating 
corporate social performance, (5) discusses some research methodologies 
which might be appropriate in social accounting research and suggests 
that these methodologies be used in future studies of the social impact 
of corporate activities. While acknowledging that-his study "raises 
many more questions than it answers," the study is "directed toward 
researchers with the primary hope of inspiring further research" in the 
f . 1 . 17 area o soc1a account1ng. 
As an outgrowth of the interest generated at the 1972 interdis-
ciplinary symposium sponsored by the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), the AICPA appointed a committee on social 
measurement. This committee prepared a monograph on social measurement 
in which they describe the characteristics of an ideal social measure-
ment system, delineate some of the problems involving implementation 
of a social measurement system, discuss the installation and develop-
ment of a system in specific areas of social concern, and examine the 
problems and limitations of reporting on social information. The com-
mittee concluded that "disclosure of social information will ultimately 
b 1 f f 1 . ..18 ecome a regu ar eature o corporate annua report1ng. Because of 
17 Jensen, p. 2. 
18 
· S · 1 h M f Comm1ttee on oc1a Measurement, T e easurement o Corporate 
Social Performance (New York: American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants, 1977), p. 236. 
10 
the many reporting problems, the committee suggests that the accounting 
profession move into the area of social accounting gradually and audit 
social information which is auditable rather than wait for an ideal 
social measurement system to be devised: i'The likelihood that one can 
move directly from providing no assurance to the degree of assurance 
implied by a professional auditor's opinion seems to be remote. A 
19 
more likely route is for both to grow together." 
The National Association of Accountant's Committee on Accounting 
for Corporate Social Performance published their first report in 1974. 
The report is limited to a statement of objectives of the committee and 
a classification of four major areas of social performance: community 
involvement, human resources, physical resources and environmental 
contributions, and product or service contributions. No conclusions 
are made; however, the committee submits that "the social significance 
of a corporation's net income should be recognized and then supplemented 
by measures of additional social effort and impact to determine a more 
20 
nearly total measure of corporate performance." The committee 
anticipates future reports on the subject. 
The accounting literature also includes numerous individual works 
urging the accounting profession to expand into the area of social 
accounting. In 1968, David Linowes, one of the earliest promoters of 
social accounting, defined socio-economic accounting as "the application 
19rbid., p. 262. 
20committee on Accounting for Corporate Social Performance, 
"Accounting for Corporate Social Performance," Management Accounting, 
LV (February, 1974), p. 40. 
11 
of accounting in the field of the social sciences,"21 and reconunended 
that accountants extend accounting techniques beyond the measurement of 
financial events. 
Parker also advocated the expansion of traditional accounting to 
include social information: 
It must be remembered that from a societal viewpoint, 
accounting's raison d'etre lies in its role as a provider 
of information useful in making capital allocation deci-
sions. Traditionally, financial accounting theory has 
guided the information system upon which society relies 
when making economic decisions. In order for accounting 
to continue to serve in this capacity, recognition must 
be given to external costs (and benefits), such as 
ecological consequences, which have become increasingly 
material in recent years.22 
After considering the problems involved in measuring environmental 
information, Chastain concluded that the accountant's role should be 
expanded to include environmental information because societal pres-
sures will force business to provide this information and, because so 
much of the environmental information is of a quantitative financial 
nature, measuring and communicating this information seems a logical 
. f h . f . 23 extens1on o t e account1ng unct1on. 
In his review of recent philosophies toward corporate social 
responsibility, Beyer suggested that stated goals of the accounting 
i 
profession should include the establishment of principles of social· 
21navid F. Linowes, "Socio-Economic Accounting," Journal of 
Account~ncy, CXXVI (November, 1968), p. 37. 
I ' 
22 
. James E. Parker, "Accounting and Ecology: A Perspective," 
Journal of Accountancy, CXXXII (October, 1971), p. 44. 
23clark E. Chastain, "Conununicating Environmental Information," 
Cost and Management, XLVIII (September-October, 1974), pp. 26-31. 
accounting. 24 Keller, in a separate publication, echoed this belief: 
"There is a need to apply the same accounting techniques to the social 
activity of the business as is applied to economic activity."25 
Others, supporting this position include Mobley who argued that 
"an accounting limited to economic effects provides only a surface 
view," 26 and Churchman who submitted, "I believe the accounting pro-
fession should become deeply involved in helping society to measure 
the most critical aspects of social charige--of pollution, population, 
information, whatever."27 
12 
The above review of literature, although not exhaustive, is repre-
sentative of the arguments which have been made to extend the bounda-
ries of accounting to include social accounting. Unfortunately, while 
all of these studies emphasize the importance of social accounting, 
none provide descriptions of the process necessary to implement social 
accounting into the present system. 
Operational Definitions 
The social audit has evolved as a means by which to appraise the 
impact of a corporation's actions on society. The use of the term 
24Robert Beyer, "Pilots of Social Progress," Management Accounting, 
LIII (July, 1972), pp. 11-15. 
25 I. Wayne Keller, "Planning Corporate Social Performance," 
Management Accounting, LVI (June, 1975), p. 19. 
26sybil C. Mobley, "The Challenges of Socio-Economic Accounting," 
The Accounting Review, XLV (October, 1970), p. 764. 
27c. West Churchman, "On the Facility, Felicity and Morality of 
Measuring Social Change," The Accounting Review, XLVI (January, 1971), 
p. 33. 
13 
"social audit" has been criticized by some on the basis that "there 
are as yet no generally accepted social accounting principles, no pro-
fessionally recognized independent auditors, and a general lack of 
agreed-upon criteria against which to measure a corporation's social 
f ,.28 per ormance. However, Bauer and Fenn, who maintain that social 
responsibility cannot exist without some form of social audit, define 
the term as "a commitment to systematic assessment of and reporting on 
some meaningful, definable domain of a company's activities that have 
. 1 . ,.29 soc1a 1mpact. Nonetheless, because of their recent origin, corpo-
rate social audits vary considerably both in terms of scope and 
disclosure. 
Due to the absence of a social measurement system, Dilley and 
Weygandt have concluded that, at the present time, a cost-benefit 
approach to social disclosure is premature. As a practical alternative, 
they have suggested a cost approach whereby " .. the business 
enterprise discloses its socially responsible activities and indicates 
h h . . ,30 t e amount spent on eac act1v1ty. In order to implement their 
recommendation, Dilley and Weygandt conducted a social audit of a 
cooperating Midwestern utility company. The results of their audit 
28David H. Blake, William C. Frederick, and Mildred S. Myers, 
Social Auditing: Evaluating the Impact of Corporate Programs (New York, 
1976, 1976)' p. 3 .. 
29 Raymond 
Social Audit?" 
p. 38. 
A. Bauer and Dan H. Fenn, Jr., "What is a Corporate 
Harvard Business Review, LI (January-February, 1973), 
30 Steven C. Dilley and Jerry J. Weygandt, "Measuring Social 
Responsibility: An Empirical Test," Journal of Accountancy, CXXXIV 
(September, 1973), p. 63. 
14 
were reported in a "social responsibility annual report." Much of the 
information in the report consisted of information required by govern-
ment agencies. It included: (1) descriptive characteristics of the 
company's social impact in the community, (2) the annual poundage of 
air pollutants emitted, (3) water resource demands for electric power 
generation, (4) occupational health and safety statistics, and (5) 
minority recruitment and promotion data. 
Using a variety of measurement units, the authors made no attempt 
to assess the company's social performance. Thus, any judgment con-
cerning the firm's social efforts was left to the reader. 
Linowes, who submits that "social-economic audits would inevitably 
generate social reports," 31 has proposed a Socio-Economic Operating 
Statement (SEOS) which is reproduced in Table I. 
Linowes' report attempts to compare social contributions against 
social costs. To qualify as an improvement, "expenditures ... have to 
be aimed at enhancing the welfare of either employees or the public, 
f f h d d/ . 1 d. . ,32 sa ety o t e pro uct, an or env1ronmenta con 1t1ons. Only 
voluntary activities are eligible for inclusion; thus, actions required 
by law or union contract do not qualify. Detriments are negative SEOS 
items which "would be charged against the company when a responsible 
authority brought the need for social action to management's attention 
but management did not voluntarily take the action required." 33 
31n. F. Linowes, The Corporate Conscience (New York, 1974), p. 102. 
32Ibid. , p. 112 
33Ibid. 
TABLE I 
CHEM PRODUCTS MANUFACTURING CO., INC. 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC OPERATING STATEMENT 
FOR THE YEAR ENDING 
DECEMBER 31, 1973 
I. Social Actions--People-Related 
A. Improvements 
1. Minority enterprise technical assistance 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
program 
Emergency flood relief 
Training program for handicapped workers 
Executive time--hospital trusteeship 
Minority hiring program--extra training 
and turnover costs 
$ 4,000 
3,000 
8,000 
5,000 
6,000 
6. Day-care center for children of employees: 
set-up and maintenance cost; voluntarily 
established 11,000 
Total Improvements 
B. Less Detriments 
37,000 
1. Postponed installation of hydraulic 
safety control system--cost of unit 16,000 16,000 
C. People-Related Actions--Net Improvement 
for the Year 
II. Social Actions--Environment-Related 
A. Improvements 
1. Cost of installing water quality 
monitoring system to control 
pollution 22,000 
2. Cost of clearing and landscaping 
company-owned ravaged area and dump 41,000 
3. Executive time--free consulting service 
to state environmental protection agency 4,000 
Total Improvements 
B. Less Detriments 
1. Deferral of liquid waste treatment 
facility 60,000 
2. Postponed installation of higher smoke 
stacks to reduce air pollution 19,000 
Total Detriments 
C. Environment-Related Actions--Net Deficit 
for the Year 
III. Social Actions--Product-Related 
A. Improvements 
1. Voluntarily discontinued alkaline product 
judged unsafe for home use--projected 
annual net income 23,000 
2. Salary of chemical engineer on loan to 
government product safety committee 21,000 
Total Improvements 
B. Less Detriments 
$21,000 
67,000 
79,000 
($12,000) 
44,000 
15 
TABLE I (CONTINUED) 
1. Cost of process redesign to reduce 
manufacturing hazard--recommended 1y 
Safety Council, but implementation 
16 
deferred $36,000 36,000 
C. Product-Related Actions--Net Improvement 
for the Year 
Total Socio-Economic Improvements for the Year Ending 
December 31, 1973 
Add: Net Cumulative Socio-Economic Improvements as at 
January 1, 1973 
Grand Total Net Socio-Economic Improvements 
To December 31, 1973 
$ 8,000 
$ 17,000 
$176,000 
$193,000 
Source: David F. Linowes, The Corporate Conscience, 1974, p. 117. 
The major criticism of the Linowes report would seem to be that 
both benefits and costs are revealed in terms of dollars expended with 
no attempt to measure the quality of the expenditure. 
Estes has proposed a social reporting model in which costs and 
benefits are reflected from the vantage point of society rather than 
the firm. A condensed version of the model is shown in Table II. 
The objective of the Estes model is "to report fully the direct 
effects of the reporting entity on other elements of society and on 
society collectively."34 The model measures social costs in terms of 
societal utility losses; however, benefits are measured in terms of 
outlays. Thus, the major criticism of the model would seem to be its 
failure to measure the quality of the benefits. Moreover, standardized 
34Ralph W. Estes, ·~ Comprehensive Corporate Social Reporting 
Model," Social Accounting: Theory, Issues and Cases.in Lee J. Seidler 
and Lynn L. Seidler (New York, 1975), p. 203. 
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measurement techniques are not available for some of the items in his 
report. At the present time, the model appears to be more conceptual 
than practical. 
TABLE II 
THE PROGRESSIVE COMPANY CORPORATE SOCIAL 
REPORT FOR THE YEAR ENDED 
DECEMBER 31, 1984 
Social Benefits: 
Products and services provided 
Payments to other elements of society 
Services to employees 
Improvements in environment 
Staff services donated to others 
Equipment and facility services donated 
Other benefits 
Total Social Benefits 
Social Costs: 
Human services used 
Raw material purchases 
Building and equipment purchases 
Other goods and materials used 
Payments from other elements of society 
Environmental damage 
Public services used 
Public facilities used 
Work-related injuries and illness 
Other social costs 
Total Social Costs 
Social Surplus (Deficit) for the year 
$ XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
XXX 
Accumulated Surplus (Deficit) for Company, December 31, 1983 
Accumulated Surplus (Deficit) for Company, December 31, 1984 
$ XXX 
XXX 
$ XXX 
XXX 
$ XXX 
Source: Ralph W. Estes, "A Comprehensive Corporate Social Reporting 
Model," Social Accounting: Theory, Issues and Cases in L. J. 
and L. L. Seidler, (1975), p. 194. 
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Corcoran and Leininger have proposed an Environmental Exchange 
Report which utilizes several units of measurement to reflect inputs 
and outputs of both physical and human resources. Human resource input 
includes "information such as number of employees, educational level, 
tenure with firm; number of manhours used by the firm; and number of 
h f . d . . ' d .. k 1 " 35 H ours o pa1 vacat1on an s1c eave. uman resource output con-
sists of employee retirements, terminations, and wage information. 
Physical resource input describes both direct and indirect materials 
used while physical output describes "the physical products marketed, 
the waste and residue resulting from the productive process."36 Much 
of the report is in a narrative form. For example, Corcoran and 
Leininger list the following under "Physical Resources" in their 
sample report: 
Air--S tons of solid material in the form of dust were un-
avoidably emitted into the atmosphere. During the month of 
June, the firm was fined $3,000 for excessive emissions into 
the air caused by the breakdown of our air pollution control 
system. Management decided a~ainst suspending production 
during the breakdown period.3 
Unfortunately, the absence of certain economic information in the 
report creates a problem when attempting to evaluate the economic im-
pact of the information. The primary advantage of the model lies in its 
simplicity and its utilization of existing measurement techniques. 
35 A. Wayne Corcoran and Wayne E. Leininger, Jr., "Financial 
Statements--Who Needs Them?" Financial Executive, XXXVIII (August, 
1970), p. 45. 
3 7 Ibid. , p. 4 7. 
A less formal proposal to extend corporate social reporting has 
been submitted by Marlin. 38 After examining the various dimensions of 
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the pollution problem, Marlin concluded that mere disclosure of expendi-
tures and/or compliance information is inadequate because (1) expendi-
tures frequently include costs of new equipment which will serve other 
purposes in addition to pollution control, and (2) compliance ·is a 
meaningless standard because environmental regulations vary considerably 
among states. Consequently, Marlin has proposed what he believes to 
be two more meaningful standards. The first of these is his "State-of-
the-Art Standard." Its purpose is to determine if ". . significantly 
better equipment to control pollution is available. If so, then the 
present equipment must be called inadequate."39 To illustrate his 
proposal, Marlin set up a general guide for a fictitious paper manu-
facturer in which he listed various discharges associated with pulp 
production and several methods of controlling these discharges. Each 
individual mill was then evaluated to determine whether they were using 
the best possible equipment for each of five kinds of discharges. The 
results of this evaluation were then summarized in an "annual pollution 
report" complete with a hypothetical opinion: 
In addition to the financial statements, we have examined 
to the extent considered necessary in the circumstances 
all assertions in this report regarding the company's com-
pliance with environmental regulations and the adequacy of 
its existing and planned pollution control ~quipment. In 
our opinion these assertions are consistent with independent 
inquiries made with regulatory authorities, equipment 
38 John Tepper Marlin, "Accounting for Pollution," Journal of 
Accountancy, CXXXV (February, 1973), pp. 41-46. 
39 Ib1. d.' 42 43 pp. - . 
suppliers and outside scientific consultants; with in-
spection of company records of equipment purchased and 
periodic efficiency ratings; and with state-of-the-art 
standards developed by the AICPA committees on environ-
mental accounting and social measurement and the committee 
on pollution control of the Am~rican Paper Institute.4° 
Marlin also recommended a standard for measuring the types and 
amounts of pollutants emitted into the air. Compliance with this sec-
ond standard would also be indicated in his hypothetical opinion. 
Obviously, neither the. standards nor the committees referenced in 
the above hypothetical opinion exist.. While Marlin has proposed two 
standards, he has not attempted to provide measuring techniques for 
setting up these standards. Hence, Marlin's proposal, while interest-
ing, is unworkable. 
In 1971, Abt Associates Inc., conducted "the first comprehensive 
and quantitative social audit completed by a private corporation and 
presented to the public with other required financial reporting state-
ments."41 Since that time, Abt has continued to produce, in various 
formats, an annual social report. Because the Abt social audit 
"assumes that all social benefits and costs have economic values that 
can be expressed in monetized, quantitative terms,"42 the components 
of the audit report are in dollars. 
A condensed version of the 1975 Abt report is presented in Table 
III. It should be noted that net social income does not flow into the 
40Ibid., p. 44. 
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41clark C. Abt, The Social Audit for Management (New York, 1977), 
p. 254. 
42 Ibid., p. 26. 
social equity account on the social balance sheet; it is assumed to be 
paid out ns it is created. 
Social 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Social 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Social 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Social 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
TABLE III 
CONDENSED VERSION OF 1975 ABT SOCIAL REPORT 
SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL BALANCE SHEET 
Assets: 
Staff Assets 
Organization Assets 
Public and Community Assets 
Stockholder's Assets 
Total Assets 
Liabilities: 
Staff Liabilities 
Organization Liabilities 
.Public and Community Liabilities 
Stockholder's Liabilities 
Total Liabilities 
Social Equity 
Total Liabilities and Social Equity 
Benefits: 
SOCIAL AND FINANCIAL 
INCOME STATEMENT 
To Company/Stockholders 
To Staff 
To Clients/General Public 
To Community 
Total Benefits 
Costs: 
To Company/Stockholders 
To Staff 
To Clients/General Public 
To Community 
Total Costs 
Net Social Income 
Total Social Costs and Net Social Income 
1975 
$26,727,000 
1,012,000 
940,000 
8,417,000 
$37,096,000 
$26,727,000 
1,189,000 
270,000 
4,787,000 
32,973,000 
4,123,000 
$37,096,000 
$16,351,000 
9,197,000 
17,510,000 
151,000 
$43,209,000 
$15,457,000 
7,626,000 
16,235,000 
45,000 
39,363,000 
3,846,000 
$43,209,000 
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Clark C. Abt, The Social Audit for Management (New York, 1977), 
pp. 256-259. 
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While extensive footnotes (not reproduced) provide the reader some 
understanding of the measurement techniques used in the Abt report, 
the physical and monetary measurements are, nevertheless, complex and 
controversial. A major criticism of the model is the attempt to 
reduce social performance to monetary terms. Other criticisms of the 
Abt report include the content. For example, Jensen observes: "Abt 
Associates included more in its social audits than have many other 
firms. But Abt also excluded' many possible items. ''43 
While a number of private companies have conducted some sort of 
social audit during recent years, the Abt model is probably the most 
comprehensive social audit report yet provided. 
In summary, the above studies are representative--but not all-
inclusive--of those works which endeavor to provide a means to report 
corporate social activity. Unfortunately, no attempt has been made to 
evaluate these models in terms of human response. 
The Need for Research 
The primary factor to be considered in evaluating any form of 
social reporting is the perceived impact of the information on the 
user's behavior. If users ignore social disclosure, there is no in-
formational value in the disclosure. Yet, the failure to consider 
this factor is a common characteristic of all the proposed social 
reporting models. 
Any attempt to expand the range of data currently provided in 
financial reports represents data expansion. Obviously, this includes 
43 Jense~, p. 53. 
social disclosure; however, there is little, if any, evidence that 
social disclosure will cause users to alter their judgmental process. 
Because it seems unlikely that any kind of data expansion is entirely 
costless, costs could exceed benefits. 
"Information is any input that changes probabilities (or certain-
44 ties) in any way." However, "the utility of a particular type of 
information cannot be effectively evaluated apart from the users of 
that information."45 Regrettably, a satisfactory definition of users 
remains obscure. While this failure to specify the users prohibits an 
optimal solution to the social reporting problem, sub-optimal research 
seems more palatable than no research at all. 
Haphazard data expansion without the benefit of empirical study 
should not be the basis for policy-making. The informational value of 
social disclosure should be investigated before artibrarily including 
it in the financial report. 
The difficulties of attempting to measure social costs and bene-
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fits have already received extensive coverage in the accounting litera-
ture; it is time to consider alternative methods of researching social 
disclosure. Jensen has already argued that there is a need for research 
along such lines as human response to corporate disclosure: "Analyses 
of human impressions may be worthwhile in circumstances where direct 
44 Harold M. Schroder, Michael J. Driver, and Siegfried Streufert, 
Human Information Processing (New York, 1967), p. 95. 
45 
Jerry D. Dermer, "Cognitive Characteristics and the Perceived 
Importance of Information," The Accounting Review, XLVIII (July, 
1973), p. 518. 
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corporate impact measureme~t and normative evaluations appear intract-
bl .. 46 a e. 
One research approac~ to, the problem involves a laboratory ex-
periment in which the impact of corporate social disclosure is mea-
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sured on human subjects representing different levels of sophistication. 
While it it recognized Fhat this type of research methodology is sub-
optimal, it is just~fied because it is believed to be worthwhile under 
the circumstances. 
Evidence in science does not usually come in one big 
dumpload, i.e., most often it builds up one grain at 
a time. Laboratory experiments sacrifice realism for 
controls, whereas opinion surveys, self-explication, 
and other forms of inquiry on real-life behavior sacri-
fice controls for realism. The sands of each, however, 
may build upon one another until we at last feel we 
understand more about information needs and utiliza-
tions.47 
Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
The next chapter attempts to develop the background and relation-
ships which support this study. Chapter III describes the methodology 
used to investigate the value of environmental disclosure in a labora-
tory setting. Also included is a description of human information 
processing theory and an attempt to evaluate the environmental disclo-
sure in terms of decision style. Chapter IV summarizes the results of 
the study; conclusions and policy recommendations are presented in 
Chapter V. 
46 
· Jensen, p. 149. 
47 Ibid., p. 169. 
CHAPTER II 
BACKGROUND AND BASIS FOR RESEARCH 
The Role of Disclosure in 
Efficient Capital 
Markets 
The primary purpose of the capital market is to allocate owner-
ship of capital stock. Ideally, under this market-directed system, 
market prices direct capital resources to the most productive uses. 
Conversely, through this same mechanism, resources are diverted away 
from less productive uses. The efficiency of this system hinges some-
what on the assumption that market prices reflect the full economic 
consequences of all available information. 
During recent years, considerable attention has been directed to 
the theory of efficient capital markets. For the most part, empirical 
research has been directed towards the question of whether investors 
perceive financial reports as a source of information from which peo-
ple make their decisions. Most of the research on the theory of 
efficient markets has centered on testing whether particular subsets 
of information are completely reflected in security prices. When 
these subsets are historical prices, the theory is said to be of the 
weak form. In the semi-strong form, the subsets are defined as all 
publicly available information. Finally, the strong form of the 
capital markets hypothesis is concerned with all relevant information. 
25 
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Essentially, a market is "efficient" if security prices fully 
reflect all available information. A rather large body of empirical 
evidence exists to support the proposition that an efficient capital 
market does exist "in the sense that: (1) market prices "fully 
reflect" all publicly available information and, by implication, (2) 
market prices react instantaneously and unbiasedly to new informa-
tion."1 In his review of the theory and evidence on efficient capital 
markets, Fama concluded that " .. for the purposes of most investors 
the efficient markets model seems a good first (and second) approxima-
tion to reality."2 
Financial reports are believed to .be an important source of in-
formation for making investment and lending decisions: 
Accounting reports provide the information by which millions 
of investors judge corporate investment performance and by 
reference to which they make investment decisions. Every 
day, decisions concerning the allocation of resources of 
vast ma§nitude are made on the basis of accounting infor-
mation. 
However, the financial report is only one source of information; 
there are many potential competitors. For example, competitors in-
elude national income reports, industrial-production reports, SEC 
registrations, statements released by corporate officials, reports 
1Nicholas J. Gonedes, "Efficient Capital Markets and External 
Accounting," The Accounting Review, XLVII (January, 1972), p. 12. 
2Eugene F. Fama, "Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work," Journal of Finance, XXV (May, 1970), p. 416. 
3American Accounting Association Committee on Establishment of 
An Accounting Commission, "Report of the Committee on Establishment of 
An Accounting Commission," The Accounting Review, XLVI (July, 1971), 
p. 610. 
filed with the Security and Exchange Commission regarding insider 
trading, and other sources. If any information from any of these 
sources causes the perceived value of a particular company to change, 
then, according to capital market theory, this information will be 
impounded in stock prices. Thus, it seems possible that financial 
markets could be efficient whether corporate disclosure in financial 
reports was limited or significant. Nevertheless, because "it seems 
reasonable to assume that greater knowledge will increase the likeli-
hood that capital will be channeled into its most productive uses,',4 
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it would appear that significant disclosure of information is required 
in order for the market mechanism to accomplish the valuation process 
necessary to allocate funds for expansion so as to achieve an optimal 
resource allocation. Hence, it would appear that "efficiency" and 
"disclosure" are indivisibly linked in our economic system. 
Normative Definition of Disclosure 
In the broadest sense, disclosure encompasses all information 
necessary for making intelligent financial decisions about a company. 
The requirements for disclosure are to be found in the provisions of 
5 6 the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
These Acts provide for disclosure of both specific and nonspecific in-
formation that is "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or 
4william S. Gray, III, "The Need for Disclosure Criteria," Cor-
porate Financial Reporting: The Benefits and Problems £f Disclosure, 
ed. D. R. Carmichael and Ben Makela (New York, 1976), p. 56. 
5 U.S. Congress, 77a, et seq. 
6 U.S.Congress, 78a, et seq. 
for the protection of investors." 7 Furthermore, Congress has granted 
the Securities and Exchange Commission broad powers to adjudge what 
disclosures, in addition to those speciffed, should be required. 
The Securities Act of 1933 was designed 
(a) to provide investors with material financial and other 
information concerning securities offered for public sale; 
and, (b) to prohibit misrepresentation, deceit, and other 
fraudulent acts and practices in the sale of securities 
generally (whether or not required to be registered.) 8 
However, the Act was restricted primarily to initial offerings. 
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the fair disclosure 
doctrine was extended to include all companies registering securities 
on the national exchanges. Moreover, this Act provided for required 
reports, the form and content to be prescribed by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. 
The SEC's 1969 Wheat Report, in reappraising the Securities and 
Exchange Comission's policies under the 1933 and 1934 Acts, concluded 
that disclosure is vital in order to protect investors from financial 
manipulation and to supply investors and lender's with enough informa-
tion for making informed judgments. 9 
7see Section 10, Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 12 and 13, 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
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8The Securities and Exchange Commission, The Work of the Securities 
and Exchahge Commission (Washington, 1974), p.l. -----
9The Securities and Exchange Commission, Disclosure to Investors: 
~Reappraisal of Federal Administrative Policies Under the-'33 and 
'34 Acts (Washington, 1969), pp. 58-59. (Generally referred-ro-aB the 
Wheat Report.) 
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Underlying the disclosure requirements of these Acts is the 
general belief that disclosure enhances the efficiency of the capital 
markets. Few dispute this belief; thus, there have been no serious 
challenges regarding the goal of disclosure. 10 However, the method by 
which the Commission has implimented disclosure policy has been 
severely criticised. 
Recent Trends in Disclosure 
Since 1964, when Congress extended the disclosure requirements to 
companies trading on the over-the-counter markets, there has been 
". • . a concerted effort to shift the emphasis in disclosure to build-
ing a reservoir of continuous up-to-date information about companies 
whose securities are the subject of a public trading market. "11 It 
is this shift in focus from disclosure in connection with the initial 
distribution of securities to continuous disclosure for the trading 
market which has prompted considerable criticism against the SEC's 
disclosure policies. 
10An exception to this statement would be the work done by 
Benston. He studied the subject of disclosure over a period of time 
and concluded that "the disclosure requirements of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 had no measurable positive effect on the securi-
ties traded on the NYSE." See George Benston, "Required Disclosure 
and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934," American Economic Review, LXIII (March, 1973), pp. 132-153. 
Also see Irwin Friend and Randolph Westerfield, "Required Disclosure 
and the Stock Market: Comment," American Economic Review, LXV (June, 
1975), pp. 467-472 for a criticism of Benston's study. 
11Robert H. Mundheim, "Trenc;:ls in SEC Disclosure for Public 
Corporations," Corporate Financial Reporting: The Benefits and 
Problems of Disclosure, ed. D. R. Carmichael and Ben Makela (New 
York, 1976), p. 56. 
30 
One of the problems with maintaining a public file of information 
is that disclosure is not always timely. For example, the annual re-
port on Form 10-K does not have to be filed until ninety days after 
the end of the fiscal year. Consequently, the major stock exchanges 
have traditionally encouraged listed companies to release new informa-
tion which might affect security prices before the release of the 
annual report. Hence, the possibility exists that this additional 
"reservoir of continuous up-to-date information about companies" is 
expensive and unnecessary because the informat·ion has already been 
impounded in the market price by the time the annual report is re-
leased.. If this is the case, then ". . . governmental compulsion of 
disclosure imposes unnecessary costs (and shifts cost burdens from 
where a free market would place them) without realizing the goals 
sought by compelling disclosure."12 
Disclosure and Social Responsibiiity 
As previously stated, the Securities and Exchange Commission has 
broad powers to det~rmine what disclosures are necessary or appropriate 
to protect the public interest: 
The Commission's broad discretion to require disclosure 
provides necessary latitude to expand or contract disclo-
sure rules in light of changes in the relevant context 
in which securities issuers conduct their businesses. 
Statutes, business relationships, supply conditions and 
a host of other factors which could not be foreseen in 
1933 and 1934 may today have a significant impact on the 
financial condition of companies and the priorities of 
investors. 
12Ibid., p. 22. 
If the Commission had not been vested with broad discre-
tion to review continuously and determine the appropriate 
content of its disclosure requirements, either periodic 
review and adjustment thereof by Congress would have been 
necessary or disclosure would have been frozen in the mold 
dictated by conditions perceived in 1933 and 1934. 13 
In exercising these broad discretionary powers to expand or con-
tract disclosure rules the Commission has traditionally regarded its 
objectives as disclosing those items which were essentially economic 
in nature. This is consistent with the spirit of the House Report 
which preceded the Securities Act: 
The type of information required to be d{sclosed is of 
a character comparable to that demanded by competent 
bankers from their borrowers, and has been worked out 
in the light of these and other requirements. 1 
The National Environmental Policy Act 
Profound changes have transpired since the Commission was estab-
lished. During the 1950s and 1960s, the deteriorating condition of 
the quality of air and water in our society resulted in widespread 
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public concern about the environment. Along with this concern was the 
belief, by many, that business was responsible for this debasement of 
natural resources. Thus, in the past decade, industrial processes, 
and the environmental impact of these processes have come under close 
public scrutiny. 
In an effort to deal with existing environmental problems and to 
attempt to avoid new ones, Congress, in 1969, passed the National 
13 The Securities and Exchange Commission, Securities Act of 1933 
Release No. 5627 and Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 Release~ 
11733, p. 3. 
14 U. S. Congress, House, Report no. 85, 71d Cong-.:-esc;, lc;t 
Session (Washington, 1933), p. 4. 
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Environmental Policy Act (NEPA.) 15 Section lOl(a) of this Act estab-
lishes the "continuing policy" of the federal government "to use all 
practicable means and measures" to protect environment.values. The 
NEPA is unique in that it authorizes and requires all federal agencies 
to consider environmental protection when exercising rulemaking 
authority. For example, Section 102(1) requires that "to the fullest 
extent possible . the policies, regulations and public laws of the 
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with 
the policies set forth in (the Act:)" 
Against this background, the SEC, in 1973, adopted disclosure 
rules in order to "promote investor protection and at the same time 
16 promote the purposes of NEPA." Essentially, these rules limited 
required disclosure to those "material effects which compliance with 
environmental laws and regulations may have upon the capital expendi-
tures, earnings and competitive positions of the issuer and its sub-
'd' . ,17 s1 1ar1es. 
In a suit filed by the National ResourcesDefense Council in 
which the plaintiffs asked for review of the SEC's environmental dis-
closure rules, the district court judge held that the SEC failed to 
state the environmental disclosure rules in enough detail to enable 
the court to review the Commission's policies under NEPA. Moreover, 
the court ordered the Securities and Exchange Commission to implement 
15National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. 
16u. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Release No. 5386/ 
April 20, 1973," SEC Docket (Washington, May l, 1973), p. 2. 
17Ibid. 
"rulemaking action to bring the Commission's corporate disclosure 
regulations into full compliance with the letter and spirit of 
NEPA."18 
As a result of this directive, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission scheduled public hearings on April 14, 1975, to examine the 
issue of social performance disclosure and to determine whether 
investors desire disclosure information on environmental (and other 
social) issues. 
The number of respondents to the hearings was relatively small; 
nevertheless, as a result of the testimony, the Commission concluded: 
... information regarding the effects a company's 
operations have on the environment may be important 
to some investors if the information can be made avail-
able in a manageable form without substantial costs which 
outweight the benefits to investors. The Commission 
therefore proposes to amend the Instructions as to 
Exhibits of the various registration and reporting 
forms to include an additional instruction which would 
require the disclosure of certain environmental compli-
ance information.l9 
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In considering environmental disclosure alternatives, the Commis-
sion concluded that disclosure of corporate non-compliance with appli-
cable environmental standards was a feasible option. "Pursuant to 
federal environmental statutes, most corporations are presently re-
quired to monitor and file quantitive reports, which are publicly 
available, regarding many aspects of their activities which affect the 
18 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,_v. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C., 1974). 
19securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5627 and Securities and 
Exchange Act of 1934 Rcle~No. 11733-,-p.49. --
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i .,20 env· ronment. Thus, reasoning that environmental disclosure could 
be made without significant incremental costs, the SEC proposed amend-
ments requiring a registrant to provide a report indicating noncom-
pliance with applicable environmental standards within the past year. 
As submitted, the proposed amendments required that each report should 
list" ... the general nature of the standard exceeded (e. g., air 
quality or water quality), the date of the report, and the name and 
address of the agency where the report was filed." 21 In addition, the 
proposed amendments made mandatory the disclosure of any "material 
estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for 
the remainder of its current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal 
year; and such further periods as the registrant may deem material."22 
The SEC Rules on Environmental Disclosure 
In May, 1976, the Securities and Exchange Commission issued its 
"final action" on environmental disclosure as proposed in Securities 
Act Release No. 5627: 
The Commission's disclosure requirements, as amended today, 
are designed to elicit information regarding (1) the material 
effects that compliance with federal, ·state and local environ-
mental protection laws may have upon capital expenditures, 
20Ibid., p. 30. Although compliance reports are public informa-
tion, practically speaking, under present circumstances, investors do 
not appear to have ready access to objective information regarding en-
vironmental practices because these reports are only available in the 
localities which are most affected by environmental practices. Thus, 
there is no central governmental source to which an investor may 
inquire. 
21Ibid.' p. so. 
22 Ibid., p. 56. 
earnings and competitive position of registrants, (2) all 
litigation commenced or known to be contemplated against 
registrants by a government authority pursuant to federal, 
state or local environmental regulatory provisions, and 
(3) all other environmental information of which the average 
prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed. 
Such information appears to be that which is of interest to 
investors and its disclosure to them would appear also to 
be of some benefit to the environment. The Commission has 
also extensively considered whether other types of disclosure 
requirements might provide additional meaningful environmental 
information of interest to investors and of benefit to the 
environment, but has concluded that, at present, this is not 
the case. Many of the proposals which have been suggested 
seem to be premised upon the assumption that the Commission 
has the principal responsibility for substantive regulation 
of environmental practices. The Commission cannot, itself, 
undertake to regulate corporate conduct which affects the 
environment. Congress and the states have created govern-
ment authorities specifically to perform this function. 
We must presume that these government authorities are 
responsibly performing their duties and our disclosure 
requirements are necessarily premised, in part, upon this 
assumption. 23 
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At the same time, the Commission withdrew its proposal which would 
have required registrants to provide: 
.•• a list of the registrant's most recently filed en-
vironmental compliance reports which indicate that the 
registrant has not met, at any time within the previous 
twelve months, any applicable environmental szandard 
established pursuant to any Federal statute. 2 
Defending this action, the Commission stated that required ehvi-
ronmental compliance reports 
. . . would not provide additional meaningful information 
to investors interested in the environmentally significant 
aspects of the behavior of registrants and that no disclo-
sure alternative of which it is aware would provide such 
additional information without costs and burdens grossly 
23u. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Release No. 5704/ 
May 6, 1976," SEC Docket (Washington, May 18, 1976), pp. 540-541. 
24Ibid., p. 540. 
disproportionate to any resulting beuefits to investors 
and the environment.25 
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This action came after an extended deliberation by the Commission 
regarding its obligations under the federal securities laws and the 
National Environmental Policy Act. Unfortunately, the amendment is 
constitutive with little, if any, empirical evidence introduced to 
support the basic premise that the environmental disclosure rules, as 
amended, will enhance the efficiency of the capital markets. In 
reaching this decision, it appears the Commission arrived at the fol-
lowing conclusions. First, disclosure should be limited to matters 
affecting investor or shareholder decision-making. Second, environ-
mental compliance reports are both costly and unnecessary to investors. 
Third, questions regarding disclosure of all other environmental infor-
mation should be resolved in terms of what the average, prudent in-
vestor ought to know. However, the investor's decision model is not 
identified. 
The conclusions supporting the Commission's action on required 
environmental disclosure are anecdotal and seem to be supported pri-
marily by comments received by the Commission concerning the proposed 
amendment. For example, regarding their decision to require appropri-
ate disclosure of the material effects of capital expenditures needed 
to comply with the environmental protection laws, the Commission 
stated that "the majority of commentators . . . either raised no 
26 
objection to, or did not comment on, the proposal." 
25 Ibid. 
26 rbid., p. 542. 
In support of its decision to withdraw the proposal to require 
environmental compliance information, the Commission stated: 
Comments received by the Commission almost unanimously 
opposed the proposal to require lists of registrants' most 
recently filed environmental compliance reports which indi-
cate noncompliance, at any time within the previous twelve 
months. • • • A significant number of interested parties 
suggested that the proposals would elicit disclosure which 
was inherently misleading. In this regard it was asserted 
that . . . environmental compliance reports generally con-
sist of listings of detailed, technical information which 
require a comprehensive level of enviro9mental expertise, 
not possessed by the average investor. 2 
This concept of the average investor seems inconsistent with the 
Commission's stated philosophy of requiring disclosure specifically 
designed for professional investors. For instance, the SEC has 
explicitly acknowledged that certain disclosure is: 
primarily designed to assist professional analysts who 
have the responsibility of developing an understanding in 
depth of corporate activity. (It is) not primarily in-
tended to serve the direct needs of the 'average investor.' 
Such an investor does not usually have the time to study 
or the training necessary to fully understand the data 
which are called for ••• 28 
When the Council on Environmental Quality challenged the Commis-
sian's interpretations of its obligations under the provisions of NEPA 
and suggested the SEC 
... solicit from registrants and from federal and state 
agencies a description of the types of environmental impact 
information gathered and submitted to these agencies • 
and then determine how such information could best be 
summarized and disclosed. . ... 29 
27 Ibid., pp. 542-543. 
28u. S. Securities and Exchange Commission, "Release No. 5427/ 
October 4, 1973," SEC Docket (Washington, October 16, 1973), p; 526. 
29 SEC, "Release No. 5704," p. 544. 
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the Commission responded as follows: 
The Council's suggestion is not designed to, and would be 
unlikely to, produce information of the type which inves-
tors appear to be interested in. Furthermore, if the 
availability of summaries and condensations of this type 
would promote environmental goals, we believe that it is 
the responsibility of the government authorities which 
receive such information in the first instance to see 
that summaries ... are made publicly available. In any 
event, in the absence of any indication that the substan-
tial costs involved in such summarization would be out-
weighted by the resulting benefits, a determination which 
appears to be totally beyond the scope of our expertise, 
any such undertaking would clearly be inappropriate.30 
38 
Thus, the SEC made it quite clear that it does not consider social 
disclosure in general as falling under its area of responsibility nor 
does it consider its decision inconsistent with the provisions of the 
National Environmental Policy Act. Moreover, the Commission appears to 
have reaffirmed its traditional position that its role is to disclose 
only that information which is of financial or economic interest. 
Nonetheless, dissatisfied with the Commission's decision to limit 
social disclosure to capital expenditures for environmental compliance 
purposes and to withdraw the other proposed environmental disclosures, 
Judge Richey recently ruled that the SEC's action violated the National 
Environmental Act. Consequently, the SEC has, once again, been ordered 
by Judge Richey to reconsider its position on environmental (and other 
social) disclosure. 
With these continuing pressures from Judge Richey, the Natural 
Resources Defense Council, and other critics, it seems reasonable to 
assume that more social (environmental and other) disclosure will be 
required in future corporate financial reports. This, of course, will 
30Ibid. 
expand the range of data currently provided in the accounting report 
model. 
Data Expansion 
During recent years there has been what appears to be a growing 
interest in expanding or supplementing traditional financial reports. 
For example, the AICPA Study Group on the Objectives of Financial 
Statements recommended a supplementary statement of financial activi-
ties which would "disclose events not described elsewhere, such as 
31 purchase commitments and changes in sales backlogs." Data expansion 
has also been reflected in the significant increase in disclosure 
required by the Securities and Exchange Commission during the past 
decade. 
Revsine has suggested that "one explanation for the recent empha-
sis on data expansion in external reporting is our lack of knowledge 
concerning detailed user decision models." 32 Proponents regard data 
expansion as an attractive means of compensating for the limitations 
of the present accounting model when users' needs for information are 
unknown. 
Implicit in the argument for data expansion is the premise that 
additional disclosure will enhance the efficiency of the markets. 
"When information ... is not disclosed to the general public, some 
31AICPA Study Group on the Objectives of Financial Statements, 
Objectives of Financial Statements (New York, October, 1973), p. 38. 
32Lawrence Revsine, "Data Expansion and Conceptual Structure," 
The Accounting Review, XLV (October, 1970), p. 705. 
39 
40 
individuals might obtain it and earn above average returns at the 
expense of all other investors."33 The data expansion "school" appears 
to regard data expansion as an attractive way of avoiding these pit-
falls of private information within our economic system. Information 
which is not available to decision makers cannot be used in the deci-
sion making process. However, if new data is incorporated into exter-
nal reports and the decision maker incorporates this new information 
into his decision, then, certainly, the expanded financial report has 
contributed to a better allocation of resources. Thus, the argument 
that more is better than less if market prices are to fully reflect 
all available information is intuitively appealing. Furthermore, the 
logical extension of this argument would appear to support the inclu-
sion of environmental compliance (and other social information) in the 
financial reports. 
Unfortunately, there is some evidence that too much information 
could be dysfunctional: 
Information overload occurs when the human information process-
ing system receives so much data that it is not able to accomo-
date to it. The demands that the information load makes on the 
processor lead to less than optimal behavior and send the user 
beyond the level of optimal performance into his area of "nega-
tive returns. n34 
Since the ultimate factor to be considered in making judgements 
regarding the value of financial disclosure is the perceived impact of 
33 Baruch Lev, Financial Statement Analysis, (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey, 1974), pp. 251-252. 
34Jacob G. Birnberg, "Human Information Processing and Financial 
Disclosure," Corporate Financial Reporting: The Benefits and Problems 
of Disclosure, ed. D. R. Carmichael and Ben Makela (New York, 1976), 
p. 255. 
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that disclosure on the human information processor, more knowledge is 
needed regarding the investor's decision model. 
Human Information Processing 
While it has long been recognized that the user is an important 
consideration in determining what data should be included in the finan-
cial report, the lack of knowledge as to how people process information 
has hindered progress in developing an optimum reporting system. How-
ever, some recent studies in the field of psychology have provided some 
helpful insights into information processing. 
Information processing "refers to the nature and interdependence 
f 1 1 . '1 bl f . . d. . 1 1 1135 o conceptua ru es ava1 a e or organ1z1ng 1mens1ona va ues. 
Schroder, Driver and Streufert have formulated a model of the human 
information processing system which argues that the relationship be-
tween conceptual level and environmental complexity is a U-shaped 
curve (see Figure 1.) 
Initially, according to the model, more information results in 
improved decision making. Later, as the environment becomes more com-
plex, increments of data become less u~eful. Finally, when so much 
data is provided that the system cannot cope with the massive amount 
of data,the system shifts into overload and begins to yield negative 
i 
returns. This model, which applies to both individuals and groups, 
recognizes that not all systems are alike. Some systems use very 
little data; others use large amounts. However, at the two extremes 
of the U-curve, all systems appear to resemble each other. 
35 Schroder, Driver and Streufert, p. 14. 
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Whether the volume of financial disclosure has reached the point 
where it reduces the effectiveness of decision making is, of course, 
unknown. However, it does seem reasonable to believe that expanded 
financial disclosure could impede, rather than strengthen, the value 
of the financial reporting system. 
How can the demands by the data expansion "school" for more dis-
closure be resolved against the arguments and research on information 
overload? Unfortunately, there is no easy solution to this dilemma. 
However, if accounting is to provide useful information for financial 
decision making, some attempt should be made to resolve the issue. 
Obviously, there will always be those clamoring for more information. 
Likewise, it is probable that financial disclosure will never satisfy 
all users. Nonetheless, haphazard data expansion based solely on the 
argument that it might help someone is not the answer. At the same 
time, the argument of an overloaded system should not prevent the 
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inclusion of new information when such information is deemed signifi-
cant. As the environment changes, new information may be required. 
It was for exactly this reason that the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission was originally granted broad discretionary powers for deter-
mining disclosure requirements. 
Information and Decision Making 
Beaver defined relevant information as that which changes expec-
tations. Moreover, "not only must there be a change in expectations 
but the change must be sufficiently large to induce a change in the 
decision maker's behavior."36 While financial statement users are 
43 
assumed to be decision makers who evaluate a firm's financial position 
in order to make future predictions, "various kinds of nonaccounting 
information are obviously relevant for decision making."37 
Obviously, all information cannot be disclosed in the financial 
report. If disclosure is to contribute to the efficient allocation of 
resources, then the "usefulness" of proposed disclosure should be 
examined in terms of its effect on statement users. Specifically, 
proposals, such as the SEC's recent pollution disclosure amendment 
should be carefully examined in an attempt to determine whether the 
additional "load" on the environment has any relevance to the decision 
maker. 
36william H. Beaver, "The Information Content 
Announcements," Empirical Research in Accounting: 
1968, Supplement to Vol. VI, Journay-of Accounting 
37 Lev, p. 247. 
of Annual Earnings 
Selected Studies, 
Research, p. 69. 
Ideally, such non-financial information should be incorporated 
into financial reports and examined in order to determine whether the 
ensuing decisions are an improvement over. th6se made without the bene-
fit of the added information. Evaluation, however, "requires a speci-
fication of the decision model for which the information is used ... 
A promising framework for the evaluation of accounting information is 
provided by the portfolio model." 38 
Portfolio Theory 
"Portfolio theory provides a decision context within which to 
. f . . 1139 access ln ormatlon lssues. The portfolio model was developed to 
deal with investment decision problems under uncertainty and "is the 
most advanced and well-specified investment decision model currently 
available. " 40 
The traditional approach to security analysis has utilized ac-
counting data as a means of determining the "intrinsic value" of a 
security. The object of this "intrinsic value" approach is to ascer-
tain whether an individual security price varies from its intrinsic 
value; in other wdrds, the purpose is to detect overvalued or under-
valued securities. Implicit in this type of single security analysis 
is the premise that capital markets are inefficient. However, as 
38 Lev, p. 250. 
39william H. Beaver, "The Behavior of Security Prices and Its 
Implications for Accounting Research (Methods)," Report of the Com-
mittee on Research Methodology in Accounting, The Accounting Review, 
Supplement to Vol. XLVII (1972), p. 410. 
40 Lev, p. 250. 
44 
indicated earlier in this chapter, extensive empirical evidence exists 
to support the premise that: 
Capital markets are both efficient and unbiased in that 
if information is useful in forming capital asset 
prices, then the market will adjust asset prices to 
that information quickly and without leaving any oppor-
tunity for further abnormal gain.41 
Thus, if one accepts the-efficient capital market theory, one 
45 
must conclude that "unless the investor has inside information, search-
ing for overvalued and undervalued securities is not an optimal deci-
42 
sian strategy." What then, is the role of accounting data in an ef-
ficient capital market? Basically, there are two roles. For the 
securities market as a whole, information serves as a means of estab-
lishing security prices so as to allocate funds and, hence, to achieve 
a better allocation of resources. For the individual investor, "the 
only potential value of accounting information . . . would be the 
asse$sment of the risk (and hence; expected return) associated with a 
given portfolio."43 
The traditional "intrinsic value" approach is a one-parameter 
model which assumes a world of perfect certainty. Under these condi-
tions, the investor should buy the security providing the highest rate 
41Ray Ball and Philip Brown, "An Empirical Evaluation of Account-
ing Income Numbers," Journal of Accounting Research, VI (Autumn, 1968), 
p. 160. 
42William Beaver, Paul Kettler, and Myron Scholes, "The Associa-
tion Between Market Determined and Accounting Determined Risk Mea-
sures," The Accounting Review, XLV (October, 1970), p. 655. 
43 Beaver, "The Behavior of Security Prices and its Implications 
for Accounting Research (Methods)," p. 425. 
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of return (or net present value). However, under the real world of 
uncertainty, the investor must consider not only the rate of return 
but also the risk involved in predicting this return. 
The essential element of portfolio theory is that it incorporates 
uncertainty into the investment decision model; thus, portfolio theory 
is a two-dimensional risk-return decision model which utilizes a proba-
bility distribution for estimating future returns for each security. 
Only two parameters of the distribution are considered--the mean and 
the variance. The mean represents the security's expected return and 
the variance is used to measure the deviation of actual from predicted 
outcomes; hence, the variance measures the riskiness of a portfolio. 
In an efficient market, "all securities will be priced such that there 
is a single, market determined relationship between rate and return." 44 
Thus, the expected return increases as risk becomes greater. 
The Markowitz portfolio model, as simplified by Sharpe, assumes a 
linear relationship between individual security returns and market 
45 
returns: 
where: Rit = rate of return on security i for period t, 
a. intercept, 
1. 
44 Ibid., p. 426. 
45The basis of portfolio theory was developed by Markowitz in 
the early 1950's. However, the original Markowitz Model required the 
estimation of a tremendously large number of variables. Sharpe re-
duced the number of variables; thus, simplifying the model. See 
William F. Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets (San Fran-
cisco, 1970), for a detailed presentqtion of portfolio theory. 
B. 
1 
~t 
u. 
1t 
slope of the relationship between the 
individual security i and all other 
securities in the market, 
rate of return on all other securities 
in the market, and 
stochastic factor representing indi-
vidualistic component of R. 
1t. 
Thus, the variability (riskiness) of an individual security's 
return is affected by both the variability of the market as a whole 
(systematic risk) and the variability of the individual security 
(unsystematic risk). 
It has been shown that within a large diversified portfolio, 
unsystematic risk can be eliminated; thus, the contribution of risk 
by an individual security is measured by its beta coefficient, B .• 
1 
Accordingly, the individual investor should not be concerned with the 
individual security's return but rather its impact on the entire port-
folio of securities. In other words, only systematic risk becomes 
relevant in evaluating portfolio performance because the market will 
not pay a risk premium for unsystematic risk which can be diversified 
away. At the same time, investors will demand a risk premium for the 
systematic risk element of a security because the risk element cannot 
be eliminated. 
To summarize, portfolio theory provides an investment decision 
model with considerable empirical support. For those who prefer to 
evaluate accounting (and non-financial) information in terms of the 
context of portfolio theory, security analysis is reduced to assessing 
47 
48 
the systematic risk coefficient. Consequently, "the role of accounting 
46 data becomes its predictive ability with respect to B." 
then: 
If one accepts portfolio theory as an investment decision model, 
Given an expected value of B for a particular security the 
investor can be expected to make periodic (depending on the 
flow of relevant information to him) assessments of the B 
of each security in his portfolio to determine if that 
security continues to provide the required rate of return 
to compensate for the degree of risk with regard to the 47 
total portfolio that that particular security contributes. 
While most accountants believe that financial reports provide in-
formation which investors find useful in predicting the correlation 
between an individual.security's variance and that of the market as a 
whole, no one knows what non-accounting data is impounded into security 
prices which might affect a particular value of B. Thus, it seems pas-
sible that environmental disclosure could have informational value to 
investors. Furthermore, it is possible that environmental compliance 
reports, dismissed by the SEC as "unlikely to produce information of 
th h . h . b . . d . rr 48 . h e type w 1c 1nvestors appear to e 1ntereste 1n, m1g t cause an 
individual investor to reassess the B of a particular security within 
his portfolio. Failure to comply with environmental standards may 
suggest future expenditures for pollution control, fines, or even the 
forced closing of some plants--all of which could have negative effects 
46Beaver, "The Behavior of Security Prices and Its Implications 
for Accounting Research (Methods)," p. 424. 
47 Darrel W. Davis, "An Empirical Investigation of the Association 
Between Reported Earnings and Corporate Bond Prices" (unpub. Ph.D. dis-
sertation, Oklahoma State University, 1975), p. 34. 
48sEC, "Release No. 5704," p. 544. 
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on future profits. Moreover, pollution control is costly, hence it 
seems plausible that an investor would incorporate such non-financial 
data into his assessment of B. 
Unfortunately, the SEC failed to supply any empirical evidence to 
(1) support its decision to require disclosure of expenditures for en-
vironmental control facilities, and (2) conclude that environmental 
compliance reports were of no value. In fact, empirical works address-
ing the issue of pollution disclosure are virtually non-existent. A 
review of the literature reveals only one study concerning the impact 
of pollution disclosure on investment decisions. 
Belkaoui's Study of Pollution Disclosure 
In an attempt to measure the impact of pollution control informa-
tion on investors, Belkaoui conducted a behavioral field experiment in 
which subjects were asked to invest in two fictional firms. 49 The 
subjects were comprised of three groups: students, senior officers 
from commercial banks, and members of the National Association of 
Accountants. Each subject was provided with either conventional finan-
cial statements, conventional statements including the disclosure of 
abatement cost information in the footnotes, or statements disclosing 
abatement costs in both the income statements and the footnotes. In 
addition, subjects were asked to make their investment decisions under 
two different investment policies: (1) investment for income, and (2) 
investment for growth. 
49 Ahmed Belk~oui, "The Impact of the Disclosure of 'Pollution Con-
trol' Information on The Investors: A Behavioral Field Experiment and 
A Market Reaction Investigation," (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Syracuse 
University, 1972.) 
50 
Belkaoui hypothesized that ~he investment decision would be 
affected by each of the independent variables--group membership, 
accounting treatment, and investment policy. Using an analysis of 
variance model to test his hypothesis, Belkaoui observed that both the 
accounting treatments for pollution control information and group mem-
bership had an effect on the investment decision. Bankers reacted to 
pollution control disclosure whether investing for income or for 
growth. The effect of pollution control disclosure was only signifi-
cant for accountants when investing for capital gains. Finally, no 
significance was observed for students under either investment policy. 
Belkaoui concluded that "abatement costs information ought to be dis-
closed completely in the financial statements. Their impact on the 
investors' behavior has been significant in this experiment, especially 
for bankers."50 
For the second part of his study, Belkaoui studied the behavior of 
stock prices of fifty companies during the twelve months before and 
after pollution control information was disclosed in the annual reports. 
Belkaoui theorized that the informational content of the pollution in-
formation would result in security price ch~nges after the date of dis-
closure. Underlying this expectation was the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis which states that security prices adjust instantaneously to 
new information. A similar study was applied to a control group of 
fifty firms which did not disclose pollution information. As a result 
of the stock market investigation, Belkaoui observed: 
50 rbid., p. 86. 
The investigation of the 'pollution control' disclosing 
firms showed a drastic change in their price actions sub-
sequent to the disclosure date of the annual reports. The 
investigation of the firms in one control group showed 
a drastically different stock behavior. The interpretation 
would be that the market made a conversion of the 'positive 
effect' of pollution control expenditures into higher share 
valuations. This follows the efficient market hypothesis. 51 
As a result of his study, Belkaoui concluded that pollution con-
51 
trol expenditures were relevant to financial statement users and recom-
mended that such information be disclosed in the annual report. How-
ever, generalizations about Belkaoui's conclusions are suspect. The 
principal limitation of his stock market study would seem to be his 
research design. Using a static-group comparison, he assumed that 
the differences in price behavior between the experimental and control 
groups were due to the pollution control information disclosure. 
However, the study did not provide for any formal means of certifying 
that the two groups would have been equivalent had it not been for the 
experimental variable, i.e., the disclosure of pollution control ihfor-
mation. Moreover, it is possible that information regarding pollution 
control had been "leaked'' to the public prior to the release date of 
the annual report. In that case, an efficient capital market would 
already have impounded the pollution information into the security 
prices. Thus, it is possible that the observed price changes were 
caused by some other variable. 
Belkaoui's field experiment is also of limited utility because of 
its lack of external validity. Laboratory experiments are subject to 
numerous methodological limitations. Respondents operate in a sterile 
51Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
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environment which is not necessarily isomorphic to the real world. 
Thus, n•sults of the experiment apply only to the subjects studied. 
Moreover, Bclkaoui described his subjects as ''lower echelon individuals 
who are more likely to follow some set of fixed decision rules in their 
. .d . . ,52 1nvestment ec1s1on. Attributes of experimental subjects cannot be 
described by such sweeping assumptions. However, Belkaoui made no 
attempt in the study to identify the subjects in terms of information 
processing behavior. 
Finally, Belkaoui conducted his study prior to the time the 
Securities and Exchange Commission first proposed pollution information 
disclosure. Thus, the SEC's disclosure amendment specifies a different 
form than Belkaoui used in his experiment. Moreover, prior to the 
SEC's action on pollution disclosure, companies disclosed such infor-
mation on a voluntary basis; hence, it is possible that such disclosure 
was biased towards "positive" information. 
Conclusions Regarding Environmental 
Disclosure in Financial Reporting 
Allowing the process of haphazard data expansion to continue in 
determining the content of the financial report is not in the best 
interests of the accounting profession. There are several reasons why 
environmental disclosure should be investigated. First, there is lit-
tle, if any, evidence that environmental disclosure will cause users 
to alter their judgmental process. If users ignore the additional data, 
then there is .no informational value in the disclosure. Second, if 
52Ibid., p. 88. 
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users are unable to enhance their decisions with the additional data, 
then the concept of information overload may become an issue. Finally, 
as the public becomes more aware of corporate "social responsibility," 
it is possible that there is a need for disclosure of non-financial 
data, such as environmental compliance information .. 
Such non-financial information might be used by investors to 
judge management's ability to perceive society's changing demands so 
that they can act to keep the corporation profitable in the long run. 
Hence, the non-financial information might be used to evaluate the 
riskiness of the security. 
In summary, some critical means of evaluating the relevance of 
environmental disclosure to financial decision-making is needed. In 
the following chapters, an attempt is made to determine whether envi-
ronmental disclosure appears to have information value to the subjects 
tested •. In addition, the research examines the problem in terms of 
decision style theory. 
CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the hypotheses and methodology utilized to 
accomplish the objectives of this research. The first objective was to 
investigate the effect of environmental disclosure on users' decision 
making. In connection with this objective, the following null hypothe-
sis was formulated: 
1 Ho : Disclosure of corporate compliance or non-compliance 
with applicable environmental standards in the annual 
report does not possess informational content. 
However, questions concerning the content of financial re~orts 
cannot be resolved without considering the impact of the financial re-
ports on multifarious users. Annual reports are used by diverse groups 
with various levels of financial sophistication. Thus, questions con-
cerning the content of financial statements "invariably transform them-
selves into questions about perception, information processing and 
decision making."1 While behavioral research in accounting is replete 
with methodological problems; nonetheless, as interest in investor psy-
chology increases, a greater need for methodological refining becomes 
obvious. Although it is impossible to test the representativeness of 
1 Thomas R. Hofstedt, "Some Behavioral Parameters of Financial 
Analysis," The Accounting Review, XLVII (October, 1972), p. 679. 
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"surrogate investors" until the "investor" is completely identified, 2 
"behavioral research in accounting simultaneously must consist of 
theory-building and methodology (sic) refining. ·. The problems of identi-
fyin'g significant variables and .generalizing from experimental findings 
are inextricably linked." 3 Thus, a secondary objective of this study 
may be regarded as a "methodological experiment" in wbich an attempt is 
made .to learn more about certain behavioral parameters of the receiver 
or user of accounting information. Certain key questions are consid-
ered: (l) What is the importance of the pollution disclosure infor-
mation relative to that of the conventional statements? (2) Assuming 
that earnings per share is an important variable, will a decrease in 
earnings per share cause subjects to place more emphasis on the pol-
lution disclosure information? (3) Is the pollution disclosure more 
influential as a negative force rather than a positive force in the 
decision making process? (4) Will all subject groups arrive at simi-
lar investment decisions in spite of differences in financial sophis-
tication? (5) What is the effect of information processing behavior 
on the investment decision? 
While the answers to these questions are obviously important in 
determining the content of annual reports, behavioral characteristics 
have been somewhat ignored in the designing of financial reporting 
2Beaver and Demski have addressed the issue of heterogeneous 
users and have concluded that "we cannot rely on a single, isolated 
investor in our description of the investor setting." William H. 
Beaver and Joal S. Demski, "The Nature of Financial Accounting Objec-
tives: A Summary and Synthesis," Studies in Financial Accounting 
Objectives, 1974, pp. 170-185. 
3 Hofstedt, p. 692. 
56 
systems. Thus, this paper explores certain behavioral factors in terms 
of (1) levels of financial sophistication, and (2) information theory. 
In order to provide insight on the research methodology used, a review 
of certain features of information processing and decision style theory 
follows. 
Human Information Processing and 
Decision Style Theory 
The human information processing system model and decision style 
theory have developed through the "differential" school of cognitive 
psychology. According to this school of thought, it is assumed that 
"people differ in cognition but that categories of people can be iden-
tified with similar thought processes . . . . The advantage of this 
approach is that one can generalize yet be concerned with individual 
differences."4 The approach is unique in that it specifically con-
siders the decision maker as a human information processing system. 
According to human information processing theory, the maximum 
level of information processing is achieved at some optimal level of 
environmental complexity (point X in Figure 2.) As environmental com-
plexity increases or decreases (points Z and Y) from the optimum level, 
the conceptual level of information processing decreases. Thus, the 
conceptual level of the decision maker is influenced by the environ-
mental complexity. Since, for the user of financial statements, the 
perceived complexity is a function of the content of the annual report, 
4Michael J. Driver and Theodore J. Mock, "Human Information 
Processing Decision Style Theory, and Accounting Information Systems," 
The Accounting Review, L (July, 1975), p. 495. 
it seems that accounting does influence users' conceptual levels. 
Therefore, in order to provide more "useful" information, some knowl-
edge of the users' data needs and decision models is desirable. 
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Figure 2. General Relationship Between 
Environmental and Behavioral 
Complexity 
Levels of Information Processing 
Driver and Hock have postulated two dimensions of information 
57 
processing. These dimensions are the amount of information used and 
the degree of focus in the use of the data. 5 The amount of information 
used varies according to the conceptual scheme of the decision maker. 
5rbid., pp. 496-497. 
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At one extreme is the minimum data user who uses only enough data to 
make a reasonable decisi.on wi.thi.n a minimum amount of time; at the 
other extreme is the maximum data user who perceives all of the avail-
able data to be relevant. Ignoring time, he examines the data until 
several superior solutions materialize. 
The degree of focus refers to the number of conclusions reached 
by the decision maker. At one end of the scale is the person who sees 
all data as unambiguous. Since the problems of choice rarely arise, 
this person is able to form a single conclusion. The person who inter-
prets several meanings from the data is at the other end of the scale; 
this person will generate multiple solutions regarding any given set 
of data. 
From these two dimensions, four fundamental decision styles have 
been identified. 
Decision Styles 
The decisive (or simple) decision style identifies and evaluates 
stimuli unidimensionally. Because speed and efficiency are of the 
utmost importance, this style utilizes a minimum amount of data to form 
a single solution or decision. An example of the decisive style might 
be the investor who makes a decision based on a simple fixed rule 
regarding the change in earnings per share. 
The flexible style, the second decision style, might be charac-
terized by ambivalence for, at this level, there is not one fixed 
rule for decision making. At this level, alternate interpretations 
of stimuli exist; however, due to the absence of fixed rules for act-
ing on these alternatives, no systematic arrangement for processing 
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the data exists; thus, there is confusion resulting in different inter-
pretations at different times. This style is similar to the decisive 
style in that it uses minimal data, but unlike the decisive in that 
the flexible style likes variety and prefers multiple solutions. 
The third decision style, referred to as the hierarchic or 
moderately high integration style, is systematically able to arrange 
various dimensions and discriminate among them. This style is able to 
utilize large amounts of data to form one best conclusion. At this 
conceptual level there is abstractness as opposed to fixity. Moreover, 
this style remains open and is able to perceive the effects of alter-
natives after making a decision. 
The difference between the hierarchic style and the fourth deci-
sion style, the integrative style, is only a matter of degree. The 
latter style is highly effective in integrating a complex and changing 
amount of stimuli. Using large masses of data, this decision ~tyle 
generates multiple solutions. "At this level, the ability to discover 
and utilize information about a range of stimuli at any given time is 
maximized."6 
Research in decision style theory has indicated that most indi-
viduals employ one dominant decision style except when the environmen-
tal load is very high or very low in which case most systems shift to 
either the flexible or decisive styles. However, some individuals con-
sistently utilize more than one style. The integrative/hierarchic 
mixed style, although somewhat complex, is common enough that it is 
sometimes referred to as a fifth decision style. 
6schroder, Driver and Streufert, p. 23. 
While each decision style has a different point at which the 
optimal level for processing occurs, research has suggested that all 
styles tend to behave similarly as the information load increases; 
moreover, each style tends to achieve its maximum performance at the 
same level of complexity as evider.ced in Figure 3. 
high 
low 
+---------~~--~--~------~~~ low "optimum" high 
Environmental Complexity 
Figure 3. Conceptual levels for Concrete and Abstract 
Groups. 
Two psychometric measures of decision style have been validated 
in laboratory and field studies. One involving a business problem 
which the subject solves and then explains his use of the data is the 
APSE (Administrative Problem Solving Exercise.) The other measure is 
the CXSD, a questionnaire which "reveals a person's self concept re-
garding his use of information." 7 Used together, these two measures 
have been found to be reliable in analyzing decision style. 
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7Driver and Mock, p. 499. The letters CXSD are merely designation 
letters and do not stand for anything. 
Decision style theory seems to have implications for accounting. 
Specifically, in the case of the proposed amendment to expand the 
financial report to include environmental disclosure, it is postulated 
that this will increase the environmental complexity of the decision 
maker; hence, it could have a bearing on the resultant decisions of 
the users. This experiment attempts to assess the subjects' use of 
the added disclosure in terms of his or her decision style. 
Behavioral Hypotheses 
The principal hypothesis presented in the initial section of this 
chapter represents an approach to evaluate the informational content 
of disclosure of corporate compliance or non-compliance with applica-
ble environmental standards in the annual report. The remaining 
hypotheses, exploratory in nature, have to do with the impact of four 
variables: subject type, decision style, decision time behavior, and 
the amount of information utilized in the decision making process. 
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A major problem confronting the behavioral researcher involves the 
use of laboratory subjects. Are students good surrogates for business-
men? Are businessmen in a laboratory environment good surrogates for 
businessmen in the real world? Unfortunately, the quality of subjects 
cannot be measured until the "investor" is completely identified. 
However, assuming that investors do vary according to their level of 
financial sophistication, it seems reasonable to speculate that these 
differences will affect their investment decisions. Thus, this 
research examines three classes of subjects in order to assess the 
difference in decision behavior among the groups. 
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In an attempt to classify subjects according to financial sophis-
tication, three subject classes were selected according to their 
education and experience. The first group was undergraduate account-
ing majors, the second group was MBA students, and the third'group was 
businessmen. In an endeavor to test whether behavioral differences in 
the decision making process of these three groups exist, the following 
hypothesis was proposed: 
2 Ho : Subjects' investment decisions will not differ accord-
ing to their degree of financial sophistication. 
In a further attempt to learn more about the behavioral aspects 
of users of accounting information, the effect of decision style on an 
investment decision was investigated. Presumably, subjects with dif-
ferent decision styles process information differently. Accordingly, 
it seems intuitively appealing to expect this difference in information 
processing behavior to affect the investment decision. In connection 
with this expectation, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
3 Ho : Subjects' investment decisions will not differ 
according to their information processing behavior. 
Human information processing theory is still in an early explora-
tory stage; however, according to the theory, the simple or concrete 
decision style tends to form a decision based on simple fixed rules; 
therefore, it is expected that persons of ~imple styles will utilize 
a smaller amount of information in making their investment decisions. 
Conversely, "integratively complex persons ..• perceive more con-
flicting elements of information in more situations."8 Moreover, 
the complex styles "differentiate and integrate more complex 
8 Schroder, Driver, and Streufert, p. 144. 
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infomation than do concrete structures."9 Consequently, it is 
expected that complex styles will use more information from the 
experimental display than the concrete decisidn styles. Finally, 
because the integratively complex styles seek more information before 
making resolutions, it is expected that persons with integratively 
complex styles will take more time arriving at their investment deci-
sion than persons with concrete styles. 
Because the results of prior studies involving similar expecta-
tions are inconsistent, the following two hypotheses were tested in 
an attempt to contribute to the human information processing litera-
10 ture. While the results may provide some insight into the behavioral 
effects of the proposed disclosure on the subjects tested, it is be-
lieved that the findings will be too preliminary to affect current 
policy making; however, the findings may have value to the accounting 
researcher. 
4 Ho : The amount of information used in the investment 
decision will not vary according to decision style. 
5 Ho : The time required to make the decision will not 
vary according to decision style. 
Description of the Experiment 
For purposes of this study, the population of interest was de-
fined as investors utilizing annual reports. A behavioral laboratory 
9rbid., p. 126. 
10see,for example, Driver and Mock, pp. 490-507, and RichardS. 
Savich, "The Use of Accounting Information in Decision Making," The 
Accounting Review, LII (July, 1977), pp. 642-651. 
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experiment utilizing both graduate and undergraduate students as well 
as businessmen provided the data. The sample of 125 subjects consisted 
of fifty-one undergraduate accounting majors, forty-two MBA students 
and thirty-two business executives. The ninety-three students were 
enrolled in a medium-sized Midwestern university and the businessmen 
were from middle to upper management levels at various firms within 
the geographical area; all of the businessmen had accounting back-
grounds. 
The Experimental Task 
Subjects were asked to assume the role of an investor, to read 
and analyze financial statements provided them, and to make an invest-
ment decision. Subjects were provided with complete financial state-
ments for two actual companies for the year 1971; the statements were 
edited only to the extent that the year and the identity of the com-
panies were disguised. The companies used in the experiment were 
selected from the steel industry for two reasons. First, the steel 
industry has been identified as a major polluter, and second, and more 
importantly, information on the adequacy of pollution controls for both 
air and water pollutants for 1971 was available for this industry. 11 
11This information was taken from the Council on E·conomic Priori-
ties' in-depth study of the environmental quality of the steel indus-
try. The CEP is a non-profit organization established to investigate 
practices of U. S. corporations that affect society and to disseminate 
information regarding their findings. Their year-long study was con-
ducted on the basis of public data only; for example, water discharge 
information was obtained from mill Refuse Act permit applications and 
air emission information was gathered from both state and local pollu-
tion control agencies. See Council on Economic Priorities, Environ-
mental Steel, IV (May, 1973). 
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Each subject was told to assume he had $100,000 to invest between 
the two companies, Company A and Company B. Company A had experienced 
an increase in earnings per share (from $2.72 in 1970 to $2.85 in 
1971). Company B's earnings per share figure had declined f~om $1.63 
in 1970 to $1.44 in 1971. In an attempt to provide as much realism as 
possible, the experimental display included complete annual reports 
(including all statements, footnotes, and the president's letter) as 
well as selected economic information for the past five years. In 
addition, the experimental groups also received disclosure information 
on the adequacy of pollution controls for both air and water pollutants 
for the various plants for both companies. However, because neither 
of the companies involved in the study appeared to have a "good" pol-
lution record, one display was purposely revised to indicate a better 
state of compliance. The experimental display is reproduced in the 
Appendices. 
The Experimental Design 
Subjects were randomly assigned to four experimental groups 
and one control group. Randomization was also used within each 
group as to which company's statements were received first. The 
control group was asked to make their investment decisions based 
on the conventional statements for the two companies. All experi-
mental groups received the conventional statements along with 
pollution compliance information. For Experimental Group I, the com-
pany with increased earnings per share was paired with "good" compli-
ance information and the company with decreased earnings was paired 
with "bad" comp}iance information (Treatment I). Experimental Group II 
was provided with the same information as Experimental Group I; how-
ever, the environmental disclosure information was switched so that 
the company with increased earnings per share included "bad" compli-
ance information and the company with decreased earnings per share 
included "good" compliance information (Treatment II.) Experimental 
Group III received Company A (with increased earnings per share) and 
Company B (with decreased earnings per share); however, both displays 
included only "good" compliance information (Treatment III.) Experi-
mental Group IV received the same treatment as Experimental Group III 
except that both displays included only "bad" compliance information 
(Treatment IV.) A diagram of the experimental design is shown in 
Figure 4. 
Instructions and Setting 
Each subject was provided with written instructions which stated 
the industry, the current stock prices of the two companies, and the 
investment objective. The investment objective was five years appre-
ciation. This time period was selected in the belief that during this 
period, pollution compliance or non-compliance would affect the per-
formance of the companies. The instructions emphasized that each sub-
ject was to make the investment decision entirely by himself but that 
any form of analysis the subject chose to use was acceptable. 
Besides being asked to allocate the $100,000 between the two com-
panies, the subjects were asked the following: (1) What additional 
information, if any, would you like available for evaluating these 
reports? (2) Besides the information furnished you, what additional 
information, if any, did you use in evaluating these reports? (3) If 
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your investment objective was for a period other than five years, 
would you have allocated the $100,000 differently? (4) How much time 
did you spend on your investment decision? 
Experimental Group I Experimental Group II 
Treatment I Treatment II 
~ n Qlli c 
Company A $ Company A $ 
Company B $ Company B $ 
TOTAL $ 100,000 TOTAL $ 100,000 
Experimental Group III Experimental Group IV 
Treatment III Treatment IV 
~ c ~ n 
Company A $ Company A $ 
Company B $ Company B $ 
TOTAL $ 100,000 TOTAL $ 100,000 
Control Group KEY 
HE A = Company A d B Company B 
i increased earnings per share 
Company A $ d = .decreased earnings per share 
c = "good" compliance with 
Company B $ pollution standards 
n "bad" compliance with 
TOTAL $ 100,000 pollution standards 
Figure 4. Diagram of the Experimental Design 
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While the experimental task was administered on several occasions, 
all administrations were conducted in the same manner. Once the 
experimental display was handed out, subjects were not controlled. 
In most cases, subjects completed the experiment without being observed 
by the experimenter. 
Upon submitting their analysis for the two companies, subjects 
were given both the APSE and the CXSD tests for measuring decision 
style. In addition, the subjects were asked to list each bit of infor-
mation used in their decision from the experimental display. 
Experimental Variables 
Experimental Variables And 
Tests of Significance 
The experiment was designed to test the hypotheses listed in the 
previous section. The design contained three levels or factors: 
subject type, decision style, and treatment. Three response variables 
were recorded. These variables were the amount invested in Company B, 
the number of items used in the decision, and the time required to make 
the decision. Due to the uneven distribution of data within levels, 
a three or two factor design was not used to test the hypothesis of 
differences in factors. Some cells had few or even no data. For this 
reason, a multivariate approach was not used. 
One-Way Analysis of Variance 
The one-way analysis of variance is a statistical technique used 
in testing whether a set of two or more sample means can be accepted as 
random samples from the same population. The test is performed to 
reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference in the popula-
tion means across all categories of the independent variable. If 
rejection occurs, then the alternative hypothesis that there is a 
difference in the population means across all categories is accepted. 
These hypotheses may be stated as follows: 
u 
n 
u 
n 
where: u = the mean score fot each category and 
n the number of categories. 
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In order to use the analysis of variance test, certain assumptions 
are necessary: (1) there must be interval measurement, (2) the sam-
pling distribution must be normal, (3) samples must have common vari-
ances, and (4) samples must be independent of each other. 
Acceptance of the alternative hypothesis permits the researcher 
to conclude that the dependent variable is significantly affected by 
the independent variable. Conversely, if the null hypothesis cannot 
be rejected, then the inference is that the independent variable does 
not significantly affect the value of the dependent variable. 
In this study, the analysis of variance was used to examine what 
relationships exist between the independent variables--subject type, 
decision style, and treatment--and the dependent variables--the amount 
invested in Company B and the time required to make the decision. 
Specifically, the one-way ?nalysis of variance was used to address 
the following four research questions: 
1. Will additional pollution disclosure affect the users' 
investment decision? 
2. Will subjects' investment decisions differ according to 
their degree of financial sophistication? 
3. Will differences in information processing behavior 
affect subjects' investment decisions? 
4. Will the more complex decision styles utilize more 
decision time than the simple or flexible styles? 
Kruskal-Wallis Test 
The Kruskal-Wallis test is a nonparametric test which can be used 
as an alternative to the one-way analysis of variance test whenever 
there are a number of independent random samples and an ordinal scale 
level of measurement exists. The Kruskal-Wallis test is similar to 
the analysis of variance in that it enables the researcher to deter-
mine whether or not a relationship exists between the independent and 
the dependent variable. Unlike the analysis of variance test, the 
Kruskal-Wallis does not require the assumptions that all variances are 
equal or that interval measurement exists. Because of these relaxed 
assumptions, the Kruskal-Wallis method was employed in testing the 
effect of the independent variables on the number of items used in the 
decision. Since .the number of items used was somewhat arbitrarily 
classified, it appeared that ordinal, rather than interval, measure-
ment existed within this category. 
The Kruskal-Wallis method is similar to the one-way analysis of 
variance in that it tests the null hypothesis th~t the category sam-
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ples are from the same population. However, the Kruskal-Wallis differs 
from the analysis of variance in tqat the former replaces each of the 
observations (in all categories) with ranks in a single series. The 
ranks of each cagegory are then summed and these sums are inserted in-
to the following formula: 
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12 k R~ H I ~- 3(N + 1) N(N + 1) j=l n. J 
where: k number of samples, 
n. number of cases in jth sample, 
J 
N number of cases in all samples combined, 
R. sum of ranks in jth sample (column.) 
J 
The Kruskal-Wallis test permits the researcher to determine 
whether the ranks are so dissimilar that they are unlikely to have 
come from samples of the same population. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
was used in testing the fifth and last research question: Will the 
more complex decision styles utilize more information from the experi-
mental display than the decisive or flexible styles? 
A Priori Expectations 
Due to the exploratory nature of the research, especially within 
the human information processing context, pre-experiment expectations 
are not well-developed hypotheses; however, certain "priors" are 
advanced. 
Treatment-Investment 
Because an increased earnings per share trend and compliance with 
pollution standards are both considered to be favorable signals for a 
company's profitability, it is hypothesized that subjects receiving 
Treatment I will invest more heavily in the company reporting these 
signals than in the company experiencing decreasing earnings per 
share and non-compliance with pollution standards. However, when the 
pollution compliance information is switched for Experimental Group II 
(Treatment II), certain questions arise: (1) When a company has 
increased earnings per share and non-compliance or decreased earnings 
per share and compliance, will subjects perceive a conflict? If so, 
(2) Which has more influence in their investment decision, the earn-
ings per share trend or the pollution disclosure? 
Pollution control is costly; recognizing this fact, it is not 
unlikely that a company that has made progress in controlling its pol-
lution problems would have done so at the expense of reduced earnings 
and, therefore, decreased earnings per share. On the other hand, a 
company exhibiting increased profits at, perhaps, the expense of pol-
lution control, may only be postponing future outlays for pollution 
control, fines, or both. Hence, it is believed that the sophisticated 
investor will recognize the potential impact of noncompliance on 
future profitability and place more emphasis on the environmental 
disclosure and less emphasis on the earnings per share trend. 
Since the experimental display provided subjects in Experimental 
Group III indicated compliance for both companies and the experimental 
display provided subjects in Experimental Group IV indicated non-
compliance for both companies, it is expected that these two groups 
will place less emphasis on the environmental disclosure and more 
emphasis on the conventional statements. 
Finally, it is hypothesized that environmental disclosure will 
cause investors to alter their decisions; it is expected that there 
will be a difference in allocation of the $100,000 between the control 
and experimental groups. In summary, the expectations are: 
1. Experimental Group I will invest more heavily in Company 
A than in Company B. 
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2. Experimental Group II will place more value on envi-
ronmental disclosure information, thus resulting in a 
greater investment in Company B than will occur among 
either the other three experimental groups or the 
control group. 
3. The investment decisions of Experimental Groups III 
and IV will be similar. Because the pollution dis-
closure within each group will be the same for both 
companies, it is expected that the value of the envi-
ronmental disclosure will be negated. Both treatment 
groups will be expected to invest more heavily in 
Company A. 
4. The Control Group will invest more heavily in Company 
A than in Company B. However, due to the lack of 
reinforcement provided by the pollution disclosure 
received by Experimental Group I, the investment by 
the Control Group in Company A will be less than 
that invested in Company A by Experimental Group I. 
Subject Type-Investment 
While most laboratory experiments utilize students as subjects, 
these studies have frequently been criticized on the basis that stu-
dents are poor surrogates for actual decision makers in the real world. 
It is interesting to note, however, that experiments utilizing busi-
nessmen as subjects have met with less disapproval. "A valid thea-
retical question, however, is whether businessmen in an experimental 
situation are good surrogates for businessmen in a non-experimental 
setting."12 Unfortunately, sufficient evidence regarding the validity 
(or lack of validity) of using either students or businessmen as sur-
rogates is lacking. 
12American Accounting A~sociation Committee on Research Methodol-
ogy in Accounting, "On The Use of Surrogates in Behavioral Experimen-
tation," The Accounting Review,.Supplement to Volume XLVII (1972), 
p. 459. 
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Hofsted has argued that "researchers cannot make simple and sweep-
ing assumptions about the representativeness or non-representativeness 
of experimental subjects or tasks."13 Moreover, Jensen, a former 
critic of laboratory experiments, has advocated "experiments relating 
. 1 . . f . h ,14 J corporate soc1a account1ng 1n ormatlon to uman response. ensen 
suggests that evidence from these studies might enable accounting 
researchers to identify "types" of people, thus leading "to better 
ways of predicting human responses to corporate social impacts, in-
formation, or lack of information."15 
In an effort to contribute to the literature regarding the "sur-
rogation controversy," this study attempts to assess whether signifi-
cant differences exist in the behavior of the three subject types de-
fined in this experiment. 
Because of conflicting results from previous studies, it is dif-
ficult to make any strong predictions regarding subject types. How-
ever, it is hypothesized that businessmen, due to their greater ex-
perience, will be more sensitive to the experimental manipulations than 
either of the two student groups. 
Decision Style-Investment 
The application of decision style theory to accounting is rela-
tively new and a review of the literature indicates that the results of 
13 Hofsted, p. 692. 
14 Jensen, p. 169. 
15Ibid. 
empirical studies in the field are somewhat inconclusive. Driver and 
Mock, in testing the theory in terms of information purchase among the 
various structures, found patterns of information purchase "generally 
. 16 
consistent with Decision Style Theory." In their business game 
study, Mock, Estrin, and Vasarhelyi found that "decision approach had 
a significant effect upon payoffs and decision times;" however, they 
concluded that "learning patterns did not depend upon decision 
17 
approach." 
This study investigates decision style theory in terms of an in-
vestment decision. Based on the premise that subjects with different 
decision styles process information differently, it is hypothesized 
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that decision style will affect the investment decision. Specifically, 
it is expected that the amounts invested in Company B will vary sig-
nificantly according to subjects' decision style behavior. Since, 
according to the human information processing model, all structures 
process information similarly at "overload," failure to support the 
above hypothesis might suggest--but certainly would not constitute 
proof--of overload. 
Decision Style-Amount of Data Processed 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, decisive and flexible deci-
sian styles utilize a minimum amount of data whereas hierarchic and 
integrative decision styles integrate large masses of data. Moreover, 
16Driver and Mock, p. 504. 
17Theodore J. Mock, Teviah L. Estrin, and Midlos A. Vasarhelyi, 
"Learning Patterns, Decision Approach, and Value of Information," 
Journal of Accounting Research, X (Spring, 1972), pp. 146-147. 
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Decisives process less data than Flexibles, Flexibles process less data 
than Hierarchies, and Hierarchies process less data than Integratives. 
Thus, as stated earlier, decision style is expected to affect the 
amount of data processed. Consequently, it is hypothesized that the 
more complex styles in this study will utilize larger amounts of data 
from the experimental display than the decisive and flexible styles. 
Decision Style:....Time Behavior 
Also as hypothesized earlier in this chapter, differences in 
information processing styles are expected to effectuate differences 
in decision time among the decision styles. It is predicted that the 
hierarchic, integrative, and integrative/hierarchic decision styles 
will take more time in making their investment decision than the 
decisive and flexible decision styles. The expected time sequence 
(slow to fast) is: 
1. Integrative/Hierarchic 
2. Integrative 
3. Hierarchic 
4. Flexible 
5. Decisive 
Limitations of Study 
This research study is limited to the investigation of the value 
of environmental disclosure in a laboratory situation. There are 
always trade-offs when conducting f;!mpirical research. One has to 
weigh the benefits of the research against the limitations. Obviously, 
the most serious limitation of this research is the methodology itself, 
that is, the lack of external validity that can be attributed to 
laborator~' experiments of this type. 
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The administration of the experiment necessarily occurs under 
somewhat artificial conditions. Subjects are not exposed to the 
rewnrds and punishments e~isting in the real world. The laboratory 
environment itself is sterile; subjects are required to make deci-
sions based only on the information provided them. Finally, the sub-
jects themselves are a limitation. Are students or businessmen valid 
surrogates for real-world decision makers? The answer to this question 
. . 1 18 rema1ns controvers1a . 
The introduction of information not presently disclosed on finan-
cia! statements is another potential restriction of this study. The 
presence of this additional information may cause the subjects to 
overemphasize the importance of the new information. 
Finally, the human information processing theory is still in a 
rudimentary stage. In order to use the model, one must assume that 
the output of the measures of decision style properly reflects the 
level of information processing. While this model has been applied 
in accounting research, the potential problems of applying behavioral 
research to.the accounting discipline cannot be ignored. 
Given the above limitations, it is recognized that the results 
of this research cannot be generalized to other decision situations; 
however, it is proposed because no other method of research into the 
area of social disclosure is obvious; thus, the alternative appears 
to be no research at all. 
18A discussion of the surrogate problems in behavioral research 
may be found in the "Report of the Committee on Research Methodology 
In Accounting," The Accounting Review, Supplement to Volume XLVII 
(1972), pp. 455-471. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
This chapter presents, evaluates, and analyzes the results of the 
statistical tests of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter III. Specifi-
cally, the following five research questions are investigated. 
1. Will additional pollution disclosure affect users' 
investment decisions? 
2. Will subjects' investment decisions differ according 
to their degree of financial sophistication? 
3. Will differences in informational processing behavior 
affect subjects' investment decisions? 
4. Will the more complex decision styles utilize more 
information from the experimental display than the 
simple decision styles? 
5. Will the more complex decision styles utilize more 
decision time than the simple decision styles? 
In the subsequent discussion of the results of the study, each of 
the five hypotheses will be restated prior to presenting and analyzing 
the relevant data. 
Investors' Reaction to Environmental 
Disclosure 
The primary objective of this research was to investigate the 
effect of environmental disclosure on users' investment decisions. 
The hypothesis states: 
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Null Hypothesis, H 1 : 
0 
Disclosure of corporate compliance 
or non-compliance with applicable 
environmental standards in the annual 
report does not possess information 
content. 
Alternative Hypothesis, H 1 : 
a 
Disclosure of corporate· com-
plian·ce or non-compliance with 
environmental standards in the 
annual report does possess 
information content. 
To test this hypothesis, the test statistic Xkj was computed to 
measure investors' response to the environmental disclosure. To com-
pute this statistic, a one-way analysis of variance design was used as 
follows: 
where: 
J.l + a. + Ek. 
J J 
the amount invested in Company B for the kth 
observation in category j, 
).l = the grand or over-all tnean, 
a. 
J 
the effect associated with the particular 
treatment j, 
= the random error term, 
the treatment defined as pollution disclosure 
or nondisclosure; j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 which 
represents the five treatments utilized in 
this study. 
The five treatments were initially described in Chapter III. In 
order to form a point of reference for the analysis that follows, the 
treatments are briefly reviewed. 
In Treatment 1, Company A was paired with "good" pollution infor-
mation and Company B wal? paired with "bad" pollution information. The 
pollution information was switched in Treatment 2. For Treatment 3, 
both Company A and Company B had "good" pollution information and for 
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Treatment 4, both companies had "bad" pollution information. Treatment 
5 was the control group which received no pollution disclosure. 
Table IV displays the mean investment response for each treatment for 
1 Company B. 
Mean Amount 
Invested in 
Company B 
1 
TABLE IV 
MEAN INVESTMENT RESPONSES 
BY TREATMENT 
FOR COMPANY B 
Treatments 
2 3 
22,826 67,800 38,889 
4 5 
39,808 52,500 
The F statistic of 4.95 is necessary to obtain significance at 
the .001 level. The F statiptic associated with the difference in the 
average investment among the five treatments is 7.310 which is greater 
than the .001 significance level as shown in Table V. 
A test of the equality of variance assumption using Cochran's 
method indicated that the five treatment samples were homogeneous; 
thus, the conclusion is that the h~ghly significant difference among 
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1subjects were asked to investi $100,000 between Company A and 
Company B. Since the difference between $100,000 and the mean invest-
ment response for Company B represents the mean investment response for 
Company A, the selection of Company B was purely arbitrary. The 
selection of Company A would have produced the same results. 
treatments was due to the effl•ct of pollution disclosure. Therefor 
on the basis of the sample included in this study, it is possible to 
reject at the ninety-nine percent confidence level the null hypothesis 
that disclosure of corporate compliance or non-compliance with appli-
cable environmental standards in the annual report does not possess 
information content. 
TABLE V 
RESULTS OF THE ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE 
OF HOMOGENEITY AMONG THE TREATMENTS 
Source of Degrees of Mean Probability of 
Variation Freedom Squares Ratio the F Statis-
tic Occurring 
by Chance 
Between Groups 4 6833.7967 7.310 < .001 
Within Groups 120 934.8835 
Total 124 
Additional insight into the nature of differences among treatments 
can he obtained by: ma'fing_ a number of specific comparisons among the 
different sets of experimental manipulations among the five trep.tments. 
The Newman-Keul's multiple comparisons test was used to compare each 
.: .... · 
treatment mean with every other treatment mean. The Newman-Keuls' 
method is a multiple-range test which takes into account the number 
of treatments in the experiment and is used for judging the signifi-
cance of a set of differences. The procedure consists of computing: 
where: w used to judge the significance of each of the 
observed differences. 
qa the critical value in the Studentized Range 
at 5%, 
p 
s-
x 
the number of treatments, 
error degrees of freedom, 
the square root of the error mean square times 
the number of observations per mean. 
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The results of this test are included in Table VI. As illustrated, 
there are two possible groupings at the 5% level. Either Treatments 1, 
3, and 4 are similar and Treatments 5 and 2 are similar or Treatments 
1, 3, 4 and 5 are similar but different from Treatment 2. 
Overall the results of the preceding tests tend to support the 
a priori expectations. However, an interesting phenomenon is observed 
in the case of the control group. As indicated previously, Company A 
had experienced an increase in earnings per share (from $2.72 in :j.970 
to $2.85 in 1971) whereas Company B's earnings per share figure had 
declined from $1.63 in 1970 to $1.44 in 1971. Moreover, Comp~ny A 
had total assets of 6.4 billion dollars compared to Company B's total 
assets of 2 billion dollars. Therefore, assuming that earnings per 
share and asset size were important variables, the expectations were 
that subjects would perceive Company A as a better investment than 
Company B. As indicated in Table IV, subjects actually allocated 
52.5% of their investment to C~mpany B. Obviously, factors other than 
size and earnings per share were considered. However, wheri "good" 
pollution information was included with the financial statements for 
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Company A and "bad" pollution information was included with the finan-
cial statements for Company B (Treatment 1), subjects allocated only 
22.8% of their investment to Company B. In Treatment 2, the pollution 
information was switched so that the financial statements for Company 
B were reinforced with "good" pollution information and the statements 
for Company A were weakened with "bad" pollution information. Subjects 
responded to this treatment by investing 67.8% of their $100,000 in 
Company B. Hence, it appears that the pollution disclosure had a sub-
stantial effect--in both directions--on the image conveyed by the con-
ventional financial statements for the two companies. 
1 
1 
3 
4 
5 
2 
TABLE VI 
MULTIPLE COMPARISONS OF TREATMENT WITH AMOUNT 
UTILIZING THE NEWMAN-KEUL'S TEST 
Standard error of 
the mean of any 
3 4 5 2 treatment 
16.98 *29.67 *44.97 23.97 
13.61 *28. 91 22.565 
*27.99 20.547 
15.3 17.122 
*significant at 5%. 
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/\s prl'dlcLed in Chapter III, investment rc•sponses in Treatments J 
and 4 were similar. In the former treatment, both companies received 
identical "good" pollution disclosure; in the latter treatment, both 
companies received identical "bad" pollution disclosure. The~ priori 
expectations were that these similar disclosures would tend to negate 
the effect of the pollution information and that the mean investments 
in these two groups would be similar to the mean investment in the 
control group. However, it is interesting to observe that while sub-
jects in the control group perceived Company B to be the better invest-
ment, subjects receiving Treatments 3 and 4 allocated a larger per-
centage of their investment to Company A. Statistically, Treatments 
3 and 4 are similar to Treatment 1. These results suggest that the 
similar disclosures did not negate the effect of the pollution infor-
mation. Rather, it appears that the pollution disclosure caused a 
change in expectations among decision makers. The implication is .that 
the pollution disclosure in Treatments 3 and 4 had informational con-
tent despite the fact that the disclosure was identical for both com-
panies. One possible explanation for this investment behavior is the 
pollution disclosure itself. In Treatment 4, the disclosure indicated 
that both companies would have to spend $682 million during the next 
five years to bring their plants into compliance with pollution control 
regulations. In the "good" pollution disclosure included in Treatment 
3, both plants would still have to spend $65.5 million to achieve 
compliance with pollution control regulations. It seems somewhat 
appealing to speculate that subjects receiving Treatments 3 and 4 
relied more on asset size to assess the capacity of the two companies 
to meet these future financial obligations. Since the control group 
received no pollution disclosure, this group was unaware of these 
future outlays and appeared to place less emphasis on asset size in 
their investment decision. 
The results of the Newrnan-Keul's multiple comparisons test were 
inconclusive as to whether Treatment 5 (the control group) was similar 
to Treatments 1, 3 and 4 or similar to Treatment 2. As indicated pre-
viously, subjects in the control group allocated a larger portion of 
their investment to Company B. One possible explanation for this 
investment behavior is that the economic conditions for the steel 
industry in general were poor. Since Company B was more diversified 
than Company A, subjects may have considered diversification an impor-
tant factor. Hence, when this factor was reinforced with "good" pol-
lution disclosure, investments increased in Company B; conversely, 
when it appeared that Company B would have to make future cash outlays 
to meet environmental standards, subjects reacted by decreasing the 
emphasis on diversification and increasing the emphasis on asset size. 
This investment behavior would tend to explain why the control group 
invested somewhere between the two extremes and, therefore, fell into 
a range of being statistically similar to both groupings identified 
by the Newrnan-Keul's test. 
The Effect of Financial Sophistication 
In an attempt to learn more about the qualities of the three 
classes of subjects identified in this study and to investigate any 
differences in their investment behavior, the following hypothesis 
was tested: 
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Null Hypothesis, H 2 : 
0 
Subjects' investment decisions will 
not differ according to their degree 
of financial sophistication. 
Alternative Hypothesis, H 2 : 
a 
Subjects' investment decisions 
will differ according to their 
degree of financial sophistication. 
Table VII presents the mean investment for each of the three 
subject classes used as inputs into the one-way analysis of variance 
design. 
TABLE VII 
MEAN INVESTMENT RESPONSES BY SUBJECT 
Subject Type 
Undergraduates 
Graduate Students 
Businessmen 
Category Size 
51 
42 
32 
Mean Amount Invested 
in Company B 
46,569 
43,809 
42,199 
The F statistic associated with the difference in the average 
investment among the three subject classifications is .179 which has 
a probability of occurring by chance of .835. Thus, the conclusion is 
that the three subject types did not differ significally in terms of 
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investment behavior; therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
-Since there were no significant differences among the investment 
responses for the three subject types, a further, attempt to investi-
gate the effect of financial sophistication on information processing 
was made by substituting the dependent variable, time spent on the 
investment decision, into the one-way analysis of variance design. 
The mean time spent on the investment decision by subject class 
is presented in Table VIII. These differences among the samples 
yielded an F statistic of 2.557 which is significant at the .08 level. 
Subject Type 
Undergraduates 
Graduate Students 
Businessmen 
TABLE VIII 
MEAN TIME SPENT ON THE INVESTMENT 
DECISION BY SUBJECT CLASS 
Mean Time Spent on The 
Category Size Investment Decision 
(in minutes) 
51 51.9608 
42 86.4524 
32 80.0000 
Exploratory research is concerned with relationships between 
variables which seem interesting or which appear to make a difference. 
Thus, for the behavioral researcher, an .08 significance level, while 
greater than the conventional .05 level~ has practical significance. 
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Therefore, the conclusion is that financial sophistication did make a 
difference in the time spent on the investment decision among the sub-
jects tested in this experiment. The following discussion focuses 
on these differences. 
In terms of time spent, businessmen and graduate students were 
relatively homogeneous; undergraduate students devoted less time to the 
decision making process. These findings suggest that the information 
processing behavior (as measured by decision time) does vary according 
to financial sophistication. One interpretation of these results is 
that undergraduates, due to their lack of financial sophistication, 
are not capable of integrating complex amounts of financial data to 
form a decision; thus, they tend to utilize only enough data to make 
a reasonable decision within a minimum amount of item. 
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In order to test the reasonableness of this interpretation, the 
Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance statistical test was em-
ployed to measure the effect of financial sophistication on information 
processing on the number of items used from the experimental display 
in making the investment decision. Because the undergraduates devoted 
less time to decision making, the expectations were that undergraduates 
would also process less data than either the graduate students or the 
businessmen. 
The test procedure consisted of ranking the observations in all 
three categories in a single series; the ranks of each category were 
then summed. The sums of the ranks and the number of observations in 
each of the three samples are presented in Table IX. This data was 
used as input into the Kruskal-Wallis formula and produced an H value 
of 5.182 which has a significance level of approximately 10%. 
TABLE IX 
RANK TOTALS OF THE N10UNT OF INFORMATION 
UTILIZED BY SUBJECT CLJ\.SS--USED 
J\.S INPUT IN THE KRUSKAL-
WALLIS FORMULJ\. 
--------·-·- -----
Category Size Sum of the Ranks 
Subject Type (n) (R) 
Undergraduates 51 2,965.0 
Graduate Students 42 2,492.5 
Businessmen 32 2,417.5 
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R /n 
172,376.96 
147,918.00 
182,634.60 
The object of the Kruskal-Wallis test is to determine whether sums 
of ranks are too dissimilar to have come from samples from the same 
population. As illustrated in the last column of Table IX, graduate 
students utilized less data than the other two groups. Hence, it ap-
pears that it is this dissimilarity which is reflected in the computed 
H value. Thus, in terms of the amount of information utilized in the 
investment decision, undergraduates are more like businessmen than 
graduate students. This is counter to the expectations that under-
graduates would process less data than either the graduate students or 
the businessmen. 
In summary, the findings of this study suggest that information 
processing behavior--as measured by decision time and by the amount of 
information utilized in the decision--does vary according to financial 
sophistication. However, as stated earlier, the objective of this 
research was purely exploratory in nature. No attempt was made to 
support or refute the representativeness of experimental subjects, 
rather certain attributes were investigated in an effort to discover 
what relationships, if any, existed. Therefore, it would be hazardous 
to make any generalizations about subject similarities or differences 
based on this research. 
Investment Behavior Versus 
Decision Style 
The third factor investigated in this study was decision style. 
The third hypothesis states: 
Null Hypothesis, H 3 : 
0 
Subjects' investment decisions will not 
differ according to their information 
processing behavior. 
Alternative Hypothesis, H 3 : 
a 
Subjects' investment decisions 
will differ according to their 
information processing behavior. 
The data displayed in Table X present the average investment in 
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Company B for each decision style. This data was utilized in a one-way 
analysis of variance design and produced an F statistic of .317 which 
has a probability of occurring by chance of .867. Thus, decision style 
does not explain significant differences in investment behavior. 
According to decision style theory, most individuals employ one 
dominant decision style except when the environmental load is very high 
or very low in which case most individuals shift to a secondary, or 
backup, style. Furthermore, according to the theory, these baCfUP 
styles are generally flexible or decisive styles. Thus, the failure to 
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[ ind signi [ icant differences ln tlw average lnvL•stmt:>nt ln Company B for 
each decision style suggested the possibility that subjects went into 
"overload" in their investment game. The hypothesis that subjects were 
operating at overload seemed worthy of investigation. 
TABLE X 
AVERAGE INVESTMENT IN COMPANY B FOR 
EACH DECISION STYLE 
Decision Style Sample Size Investment in 
Decisive 23 44,565 
Flexible 47 45,638 
Hierarchic 17 36,177 
Integrative 28 47,143 
Integrative/Hierarchic 10 46,000 
Company B 
Since the scoring formula for the Administrative Problem Solving 
Exercise (used to measure decision style) also provided backup styles 
for subjects used in this research, these backup styles were substituted 
into the one-way analysis of variance design to measure the investment 
response per category. These category mean responses are recorded in 
Table XI. 
TABLE XI 
AVERAGE INVESTMENT IN COMPANY B FOR 
EACH BACKUP DECISION STYLE 
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Backup Decision Style Sample Size Investment in Company B 
Decisive 34 37,206 
Flexible 10 53,500 
Hierarchic 26 44,231 
Integrative 39 47,949 
Integrative/Hierarchic 16 46,563 
The above evidence neither supports nor refutes the existence of 
overload. The F ratio computed for the above sample is .694 which has 
a probability of occurring by chance of .601. Therefore, the only 
conclusion to be made is that subjects' investment decisions do not 
differ according to their backup decision style. 
Information Use Behavior 
In Chapter III, it was hypothesized that complex decision styles 
would use more information from the experimental display than the 
concrete decision styles. 
4 Nul+ Hypothesis, H 
0 
This led to the hypothesis: 
The amount of information used in the 
investment decision will not vary 
according to decision style. 
Alternative Hypothesis, Ha4: The amount of information in 
the investment decision will vary 
according to decision style. 
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance design was used 
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to test the effect of decision style upon the amount of data processed. 
Table XII presents the sums of the ranks and the number of observations 
for each of the five decision styles. 
Decision Style 
Decisive 
Flexible 
Hierarchic 
Integrative 
TABLE XII 
RANK TOTALS OF THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION 
UTILIZED BY DECISION STYLE--USED 
AS INPUT IN THE KRUSKAL-
WALLIS FORMULA 
Category Size Sum of the Ranks 
(n) (R) 
23 1,572 
47 2,836 
17 922 
28 1,862 
Integrative/Hierarchic 10 646 
R2/n 
107,442.78 
171,125,44 
50,004.94 
123,823.00 
41,731.60 
The above data was utilized in the Kruskal-Wallis formula and 
produced an H value of 1.524 which has a probability of occurring by 
·~ 
,· 
chance of greater than .80. Thus, decision style does not explain 
significant differences in the amount of information utilized from 
the experimental display. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected. 
The Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance test was repeated 
using backup decision styles as the independent variable in the design. 
The computed H value was' 1. 6SS4 which has a probability of occurring 
by chance of .80. The results of this test cannot be interpreted as 
evidence of overload. Hence, the conclusion is that the evidence does 
not support the hypothesis that the amount of data used varies accord-
ing to backup decision style. 
Decision Time Behavior 
The final research question concerned decision speed. According 
to decision style theory, complex decision styles identify and inte-
grate more complex information in their information processing than do 
concrete decision styles; therefore, it was hypothesized that complex 
decision styles would take more time arriving at their investment de-
cisions than concrete decision styles. The hypothesis states: 
Null Hypothesis, H0 S: The time required to make the decision 
will not vary according to decision 
style. 
Alternative Hypothesis, HaS: The time required to make the 
decision will vary according to 
decision style. 
Table XIII presents the mean time used as inputs into the one-
way analysis of variance design for each of the five decision styles. 
The F statistic assoctated with the differences in the average times 
among the five categories is .341 which has a probability of occurring 
by chance of .8Sl. Therefore, the conclusion is that there is no 
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statistical difference between decision times among the subjects tested. 
The null hypothesis is not rejected. 
TABLE XIII 
AVERAGE DECISION TIME FOR 
EACH DECISION STYLE 
Decision Style Sample Size Average Decision 
(in minutes) 
Decisive 23 80.652 
Flexible 47 74.255 
Hierarchic 17 52.941 
Integrative 28 66.786 
Integrative/Hierarchic 10 72.600 
Time 
The expected sequence in overall speed (slow to fast) was: 
1. Integrative/Hierarchic 
2. Integrative 
3. Hierarchic 
4. Flexible 
5. Decisive 
The actual sequence was: 
1. Decisive 
2. Flexible 
3. Integrative/Hierarchic 
4. Integrative 
5. Hierarchic 
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Since the above findings are counter to decision style theory, 
one interpretation is the possibility of overload. Hence, backup 
decision styles were substituted into the one-way analysis of variance 
design in an attempt to investigate the effects on decision time be-
havior. The average decision time for each category of backup decision 
style is presented in Table XIV. These differences among the samples 
yielded an F statistic of .765 which has a probability of occurring 
by chance of .553. Again, the evidence is contrary to theoretical 
expectation. Backup decision style does not explain decision time 
behavior among the subjects tested. 
TABLE XIV 
AVERAGE DECISION TIME FOR EACH 
BACKUP DECISION STYLE 
Backup Decision Style Sample Size Average Decision 
(in minutes) 
Decisive 34 83.412 
Flexible 10 88.000 
Hierarchic 26 58.269 
Integrative 39 71.923 
Integrative/Hierarchic 16 50.313 
Time 
Comments Concerning Decision 
Style Results 
Any interpretations of exploratory research of this nature must 
be regarded as purely speculative. However, a few comments appear to 
be warranted. 
Many researchers present ~ post explanations in an attempt to 
explain unanticipated results. For example, Savich hypothesized that 
decisive and flexible decision style makers would process less data 
than hierarchic and integrative types. When tests of his hypothesis 
yielded mixed results, Savich suggested, 11 the possibility exists that 
the students had not previously been asked to make these types of 
decisions and thus had not yet formulated and tempered their decision 
2 
styles." Driver and Mock hypothesized that the more complex decision 
97 
styles would take more decision time than the concrete decision styles. 
While their conclusion was that "decision style does explain signifi-
cant variance in required decision times," 3 their results were mixed. 
They explained the slow pace of the decisive style in their experiment 
as an ov~rload condition. 
It is the bias of this researcher that such interpretations as 
the above are much too tentative to be valid. Therefore, no attempt 
is made to justify the unexpected results in this study relative to 
decision style theory. 
2savich, p. 650. 
3Driver and Mock, p. 505. 
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According to decision style theory, most individuals employ one 
dominant decisi.on style except when the environmental load is very high 
or very low in which case most systems shift to either the flexible or 
decisive styles. An interesting phenomenon observed in this study was 
that the backup styles for subjects did not follow this theoretical 
pattern. As indicated in several of the preceding tables, when backup 
styles were substituted for dominant styles, there was a greater shift 
to the more complex decision styles. While the number of decisives did 
increase for backup style, the number of flexibles decreased consider-
ably. This phenomenon, while it cannot be generalized, does suggest 
some concern about the validity and/or reliability of the psychometric 
measures of decision style. 
In summary, applications of human information processing and 
decision style theory to accounting are relatively few and, in the 
opinion of this researcher, inconclusive. The possibility exists that 
other classifications of decision style might be more appropriate. 
Further research efforts in this area are needed to determine whether 
the theory itself may need to be re-examined. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The objectives of this study were to seek, and hopefully provide, 
empirical evidence regarding the impact of enviroiTrnental disclosure 
on investment decisions and to evaluate this impact in terms of human 
information processing theory. The purposes of this chapter are to 
summarize the research, to advance conclusions concerning the results, 
and to provide recommendations for future research. 
Summary of Research 
The concepts of social accounting and social disclosure have 
pervaded the accounting literature during the past decade. The Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission now requires disclosure of the material 
effects of compliance with governmental environmental protection laws. 
Yet, a survey of the literature revealed that, while widespread atten-
tion has been given to constitutive and operational definitions of 
social accounting, only one empirical study addressing the issue of 
pollution disclosure in external reporting exists. Thus, further 
research concerning the effect of environmental disclosure in a user-
oriented sense was deemed desirable. 
While the primary objective of this study was to investigate the 
effect of pollution disclosure on user's decisi~n making, a secondary 
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objective of the study was an attempt to learn more about certain 
behavioral parameters of the users of accounting information. 
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The methodology involved a laboratory experiment in which one 
hundred and twenty-five subjects were asked to make an investment 
decision between two actual companies, Company A and Company B. In 
addition, subjects were asked to record the time required to make the 
investment decision and the number of items in the experimental display 
which were used in the investment decision. All subjects received the 
same pair of financial statements in one of five forms. The control 
group received only conventional statements. Favorable and unfavorable 
pollution disclosures were manipulated to form four treatment groups. 
In Treatment 1, Company A was paired with "good" pollution information 
and Company B was paired with "bad" pollution information. The pollu-
tion information was switched in Treatment 2. For Treatment 3, both 
companies had identical "good" pollution information and for Treatment 
4, both companies had identical "bad" pollution information. Treat-
ment 5 was the control group which received no pollution disclosure. 
In addition, subjects were classified according to financial 
sophistication. The three categories were undergraduate students, 
graduate students, and businessmen. Finally, psychometric tests were 
administered to all subjects in order to classify subjects according 
to their decision styles. Thus, the study examined the impact of 
three independent variables or factors--pollution disclosure treatment, 
subject type, and decision style--on three response variables--the 
amount invested in Company B, the time required to make the investment 
decision, and the number of items in the experimental display which 
were utilized in the investment decision. 
Due to the uneven distribution of data within levels, a multi-
variate research design was not used. A one-way analysis of variance 
technique was utilized to test the research hypothesis that pollution 
disclosure would affect users' investment decisions. To test the 
effect of financial sophistication and decision style on information 
processing behavior, a one-way design of each of these variables with 
each response variable was calculated. In the case where the number 
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of items in the experimental display which were utilized in the invest-
ment decision was tested, a nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis analysis of 
variance test was employed. 
Conclusions 
While it should be stressed that the following conclusions are 
highly tentative pending further replication and verification, the 
import of the results of this study for the SEC is that there is some 
empirical support for required pollution disclosure. 
First, the results of the tests of the primary hypothesis provide 
evidence that users' investment decisions are significantly affected 
by pollution disclosure. When included with the conventional financial 
statements, environmental disclosure did cause subjects to alter their 
investment decisions. These findings are consistent with those of 
Belkaoui who found that "information content.of pollution control 
expenditures was effective enough to induce investors' reactions."1 
Second, the results of this study indicate that both conventional 
accounting information and pollution disclosure are important inputs 
lBelkaoui, p. 118. 
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for the investor. For example, the control group perceived Company B 
as the better investment. However, when favorable pollution data was 
included with the financial statements for Company A and unfavorable 
pollution data was included with financial statements for Company B, 
subjects allocated a larger portion of their investment to Company A. 
When the pollution disclosure was switched between the two companies, 
subjects reacted accordingly and invested heavily in Company B. Thus, 
pollution disclosure appears to be influential both as a negative and 
a positive force in the decision making process. 
Third, pollution disclosure appeared to have more influence in 
subjects' investment decisions than earnings per share trend. When 
subjects were asked to allocate their investment between a company with 
a decreasing trend in earnings per share and favorable pollution data 
and a company with an increasing trend in earnings per share and un-
favorable pollution data, subjects alloc~ted a larger percentage to the 
former company. The implication is that subjects were sophisticated 
enough to recognize the potential impact of noncompliance on future 
profitability. 
Fourth, the experimental findings suggest that the observed in-
fluence of the pollution disclosure varies according to other factors, 
including asset size and diversification. As indicated previously, 
subjects in the control group perceived Company B as the better invest-
ment. One interpretation of this preference for a smaller company with 
a decreasing trend in earnings per share is that Company B was more 
diversified than Company A. Since the economic conditions for the steel 
industry were poor, investors apparently believed diversification to 
be an important factor in their decision making--perhaps even more 
important than asset size or earnings per share trend, However, when 
identical pollution disclosure was added to the financial statements 
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of both companies, subjects responded by allocating more of their 
investment to Company A. Subjects apparently believed that the larger 
company was in a better position to make future cash outlays to meet 
environmental standards. Thus, pending further investigation of ex-
planatory variables, the most likely cause of decision change was that, 
when faced with the knowledge that additional pollution control ex-
penditures were required, subjects reacted by decreasing the emphasis 
on diversification and increasing the emphasis on asset size. This 
behavior also suggests, but certainly does not constitute proof, that 
users of financial statements are able to integrate large masses of 
data and discriminate among them, 
Financial sophistication did not affect investment decisions 
among the subjects tested, No statistical difference was round between 
the responses of students and businessmen. While it might be tempting 
to conclude that students are a reasonable surrogate for businessmen 
for experimental tasks such as the one in this experiment, "the rele-
vant personal attributes of experimental subjects cannot be captured 
adequately by simple untested scales like that of financial sophisti-
cation."2 Financial sophistication, in this study, was represented by 
an ordinal scale based on education and experience, While it is 
recognized that such a scale has not been validated, "an 'education 
and experience spectrum' appears to have a high face validity." 3 
2Hofstedt, p. 692. 
3rbid., p. 680. 
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Nonetheless, it is the opinion of this researcher that the results are 
too preliminary to warrant any conclusions about the representativeness 
or nonrepresentativeness of experimental subjects; however, the find-
ings may have value to the behavioral researcher. 
The findings do suggest that information processing behavior--as 
measured by decision time and by the amount of information utilized in 
the decision--does vary somewhat according to financial sophistication. 
In terms of the amount of information utilized, undergraduates and 
businessmen tended to use more information than graduate students. In 
terms of time spent, businessmen and graduate students were relatively 
homogeneous; undergraduate students devoted less time to the decision 
making process. 
Decision style had no effect on any of the response variables 
tested. However, according to decision style theory, when the environ-
mental load is very high, information overload occurs and most decision 
styles shift to secondary or "backup" processing styles. The failure 
to find any significant differences among decision styles suggested the 
possibility of information overload. To test this theory, the subjects' 
backup decision styles were substituted for their dominant decision 
styles in the research design and the effect of these backup styles on 
the three response variables was investigated. The results of these 
tests were also insignificant. 
The decision style analysis provided results which are inconsis-
tent with decision style theory. Because the applications of human 
information processing and decision style theory to accounting informa-
tion have not been extensively tested, any interpretations of the un-
expected results would be purely speculative. However, the study raised 
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some questions about the validity and/or reliability of the psychometric 
measures of decision style. The possibility exists that the output of 
the measures of decision style do not properly reflect the level of 
information processing. Furthermore, it is conceivable that attributes 
other than those presently used in identifying decision style might 
result in improved classifications of conceptual schemes of human in-
formation processors. 
Implications for Further Research 
Accounting policy requiring pollution disclosure has already been 
initiated by the Securities and Exchange Commission without the benefit 
of empirical research. However, haphazard data expansion should not be 
the basis for policy-making. Because the goal for accounting theorists 
should be to improve external reporting models, the implications of the 
research described herein seem evident. 
First, while this study provided some tentative evidence that the 
informational content of pollution disclosure caused a change in expec-
tations among investors, a single study such as this does not provide 
adequate support for implementation of accounting policy. Studies of 
this type depend on replication and corroqoration before they can be 
accepted as an authoritative basis for expanding the extant financial 
reporting model. 
It is recommended that this study be replicated using different 
groups of subjects, different judgmental tasks, and a larger sample 
size. Another approach might involve testing the effects of specific 
alternative accounting treatments regarding pollution disclosure upon 
investment decisions. While the representativeness or nonrepresenta-
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tiveness of experimental subjects remains controversial, a replication 
utilizing less controversial surrogates such as securities analysts 
and practicing certified public accountants is suggested. 
Second, the results of the research described in this paper do 
not support decision style theory as advanced by Driver and Mock. 
Moreover, the results lend some uncertainty to the validity of the 
theory and/or the psychometric measures used in identifying decision 
styles. While Driver and Mock have explained unexpected deviations 
from decision style theory as a result of overload, they have failed 
to test their conclusions utilizing backup decision style. Since 
the concepts of overload and backup decision styles are an integral 
part of human information processing theory, more testing of these 
concepts is needed. 
Third, an implied assumption in the literature on human informa-
tion processing, and specifically on information overload, is that 
added information contains relatively small increments at the risk of 
sending the user beyond the level of optimal performance. While it is 
mere conjecture, it would seem that some information may have consid-
erable relevance and would, therefore, still enable the user to make 
a better decision than if that information was not available--even at 
overload. Moreover, based on the observed performance of the subjects 
in th~s experiment, it appears that subjects may utilize some sort of 
filtering process whereby he or she sorts through the data and selects 
that which appears relevant to his or her own information processing 
limitations. Thus, it is suggested that the possibility exists that 
users select information to suit their individual abilities. If this 
is indeed the case, the implications for accounting would seem to be to 
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permit maximum disclosure. Because human information processing theory 
is still in a primitive state, only further research can resolve this 
issue. 
Fourth, all of the applications of human information processing 
to accounting information have been conducted in laboratory or field 
settings. Ideally, human information processing theory should be 
tested with "real world" decisions in order to eliminate some of the 
problems of external validity that are attributed to laboratory 
experiments of the type described in this study• It is suggested that 
research endeavors be directed towards investigating whether abstract 
decision styles make superior decisions when compared to concrete 
decision styles in "real world" situations. 
Finally, more research is need to measure the impact of account-
ing information on behavioral responses. The lack of knowledge as to 
how people process information has hindered progress in developing an 
optimum reporting system. Therefore, replicati'on appears to be the 
only obvious means by which, eventually,. we may be able to identify 
certain attributes of information processing behavior. The identifi-
cation of certain key variables, if they exist at all, could lead to 
a much-improved financial reporting system. 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
Your eccentric uncle (a former steel company executive) left you 
$100,000 in his will; however, under the terms of the will, you may 
only have the money after it has been invested for 5 years in either 
Company A or Company B or some combination. (The uncle was never 
. employed by either company). Enclosed are the financial statements 
(these are actual financial statements but are "disguised" here) of 
the two companies--both of which are in the steel industry. During 
the current year, Company A's common stock price has ranged between 
$35 7/8 and $25; Company B's common stock price has ranged between 
$23 1/8 and $15 1/4. 
In your role as analyst, please assume that: 
1. The decision to make this allocation is entirely yours. 
2. The auditing firms for the two companies are firms 
in which you have confidence. 
3. The investment objective is for five years. 
Using the enclosed packet, please allocate the $100,000 available 
for investment between Company A and Company B. You may use any form 
of analysis you choose in splitting the $100,000 between the two 
companies. 
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TU CUHPANY A SIIAKEHOW£RS: 
This year was a difficult ye.ar for Company A--and thr..:o steel industry in 
general--with lower steel shipm~nts, erratic and uneconumical operating 
level~, labor negotiations. surging imports, rcducC"'d <.!ffi(Jloym,:.nt a 11 J 
huurs of work fur ~wployees, and lower dividends for ~tockholJers. 
C..omp.:..my A':::i incomt.! forth~ year wa~ $154.5 million, .J. return of 3.1% 
un ::;ales uf $5 .. 0 billion. Income for tlu: previous yt..:ur W.J.S $147.5 
million, a return of 3.0% on sale:; of $4.9 billion. 
ln~ume taxe::; and pension co::;ts were lowL'r this year thon last year. ~ 
-exp)d.incd iu tlte nutt;.'!S to financial ::.tacement::;, nu provision for t.;!::iti-
matcd U. S. and fondgn taxc.s on income was required this year, anO the 
intcre::;t rate assumption for· funding pension coat::i was r~::vised, as it 
has bt!eu from timt! to tlu1e in the pabt, ln light of tht..:: actual earnings 
exp~rienct! of the pension fund. Many oth~r factort;; mu::>t a.lso be recog-
niz~d to place tl1is year in proper perspective. 
Operations moved up sharply in the first half of the y"ar. Shiprilt!nt:; u· 
stt:=cl pruduets exceeded two million tuns p~.!r mouth in the sc ... --ond 'luartel 
and in July. Good produt.:Lion levels w~re attuint:d un many new facilj-
ti~s. There was a notlceCJL)y improved level of e~ndngs. 
During the l.::!::H fi\_'c munthti of tht: year. however, IIkJntl;ly sh!pult..•uts 
.JVL'l.<:~t,ed h.::::Hi tlwn half th~ rat~ of the first scv~n months <Jill.l w_ere 
lower than any- l~vel. of shipments expcrlcuced on a pl""olunged Lasis in 
u nonstrike period since the l9)0 1 s. 
Last yt!ar, the Annual Rcport'indicated that it was our objective to im-
pruve Ll1c profit contribution froru our .steel producing uperdtions. 
The prtJfJt contr!butiun frou1 rhe:::;e operations was substantially im-
pr\lVed in Lhc first seven mon,Lh.s--helped by greater vuluwc, more ef-
fective utilization of our production facilitit!o dnd un i1upruved cost-
price rclation:.;.hlp. 
ln thcoe op~ra.tiuns, howt~ver,- Wt! lost ground in the last five months 
Occuu:::;e of the problems of coping with a very_ low volume of busint:ss.. 
SeumJ half results were also i:'t!duced by lhe costs iuvolved in the 
shutd~o.JWO aud the f:iuUsequeut ::itat·t-up of ::;tee! operatious. related tu 
the :::;tecl labor llt!gotiations and by stceiwork~r hourly cmpluyment cosl 
1nt.:rea:..>es averagiug IS% starting August J. Furthermore, in the fourth 
qi.1artcr there wa::; a 44-day coal str-ike und a suUstauLlal cvst incr~a::;c 
r·t..·sultiug from the new labor contract with the United ~tine \~urkcr::; of 
•\ll1erica. Becau~c of all thes~ factors, financial reoults froru steel 
produciilg operations were at an unsati~f<Jctory Jevul fur. tltc s~cund 
half uf the ye<-~r. 
Mdny uf our oth~r operations this year, a~ during last year, continut.:d 
to achieve improvements in Jncome. 
A number of miJjor cost reduction actions have been taken in ev~ry area 
of the Corporation, including permanent reductions in .:ldmiuistrative 
anJ other (orces. With sufficient volume, we are C;unfiJ~nt th.JL our 
lllanpuwer, machinery anJ material resources provid~ the base now for 
substantially lmprov~d edrnings. 
All these expectations, however, presume that the Government 1.s, efforts-
to control iriflation will be successful, that Wt! can at least maintain 
the existing cost-price relatiunship in tl1e future, and that tile levels 
of SLt!el will produd im~"rt"' ar.: kept .econowically reallstic and in 
line with the growth of ::;tecl consumption· -in this nation. 
The growLh in ~tct:l cousumpti~n in recent year£ has all bet:!n siphoned 
off by import::; of for...-ign :Ste~). Record stee1 mill product imports of 
18.3 million net ton:; lhi;; year Loc~k 18% of the dome:;tic mark.,t. They 
took 27% of the markd during the thre" u1onths immediately following 
the t:itt!~:d labor t:ic.!tll~ment. 
This foreign steel was produced not by more efficient us~ of ldbur or 
by bctttr technology or cquipD.Itut, but by labor whose hourly pay and 
benefits total frow Ont! ·third Lo one half those of Amerfl:an steelworkers. 
Foreign stce=l producers alsu receive aid frulli their governments in the 
form of subsidies, tax pn.:icrences and various practices which encourage 
exports and re!itrlct imports of steel into -their home markets. 
The United State::; Govet·nDh!nt is negotiating new voluntary restraint 
arrangements with principal steel producing groups around the W'Orld. 
As propo~ed, Lh~sc arrangements W'uuld limit steel impol"L!:i into this 
country to au increase uf 2.5% per yt.!ar, a ral~ in line with t!Xpccted 
gL""uwth in dom~stic ste:el consumption. Tl&cy would also provide re-
strictions on changes in product mix and in geogn:t.phlt:.:..d distt·ibutiun 
within th., U. S. 
Ther~ is a growing awar~nt•t>::i that another imporUHlt fa\!tor concerning 
th" economic well-bcfng of the steel industry is 1Uiproved productivity. 
Th~ __joint union-manage~nt committees, established at each plant undt::'r 
t~ro1s of tl1is y~ar's ste~l-wurker labor agreement, should b~ of eff~c­
livc help In ~romoLing productivity improv.;:menL;;. Wayo mu:;t be found 
for further reducing custs and increasing the output per man-huur on 
ull our facilitieo. 
Billions of dollar·s bdVt:! bccu invested by the American steel industry 
iil ne.w tet.:.hnology and facilities during the past ~.iix years. Company A 
alone has invested $3.3 billion in plant and equipu1ent, with $452 mil-
lion of tl1i!:i exp~nd~d this year. 
We appreciate the continued support fro~1 so many stockhulders. We also 
apprecJate tht! support of our employee:s who have worked to irupl:"ove Cl•m-
pauy A's competitive position, and we are sul:"e all employees will con-
tinue to e><ert every effort to accumplish the results we are all seekin~;. 
Edward W. Junes 
Chairman, Bo.:..trJ of UiJ"ector~ 
COMPANY A 
CONSOllUATEO STATEMENT OF FINANCIAl POSITION 
DECHffiER 31, 1976 AND 1975 
Curr~...:nt Assets: 
Cash 
Marketable Securities, at cust 
(approxin1ates market) 
Receivables, less estimated bad debts 
luv~ntL>ries 
Total 
lt:!SS 
Current Liabilities: 
Notes and aCLOUnts vayable 
Accrued taxes 
Uivid~ud payable 
Luug-teno delJt Juc within one year 
Total 
Work in!! Cap I ud 
Uec ._ 31, 1976 
218,531,673 
54,977,259 
580,487,511 
840,774,573 
$1,694,771,016 
785, 782,'871 
264,617,949 
21,667,095 
53,796.999 
$l,l25,864~ 
56!!, 906,102 
furkt'tdble st:curitics, at cost (approxi-
mates market), set dside for plant 
anJ equipment additinus and r~p1ace­
ment::. 
lnvetitmcnts in realty, leasing and 
finance operations 
Long-term receivables and other 
investment.s, less eotimated losses 
Plant and equlpment, less depreciation 
Op.,rating parts and supplies 
C..>,;ts appi.1-c-ab I.e Lo futun; periods 
TOTAL ASSETS l.ESS CURRENT L!Allll.ITIES 
dcJuLl 
Lung-term dellt 
Re~~rVe::i aud dtferred taxes on income 
EXCESS OF ASSETS OVEK LIABiLITIES 
ANI) KESERVES 
W11cr~hip Evidenced by 
Common ~lo"k (authorized 90,000,000 
,;hares; outstanding 54,169,462 
shar~s) Par value $30 ver share 
income reinvested in business 
TOTAL 
255,000,000 
63, sou, 443 
179,726,420 
4,077,929,561 
58,290,299 
79,441 ,461 
5,282,794,286 
1,444,070,597 
331,560,086 
$3,507,163,603 
$1,625,083,860 
1,882,079. 743 
$3,507,163,603 
Dec. 31, 1975 
217,686,393 
ll, 529.302 
617,204,941 
923,458,156 
$1,769,878,792 
753,992,126 
248,157,996 
32,490,357 
__ _]_!!,082. 506 
1!...072, 7~,985 
697,155,807 
25.5,000,000 
62,598,249 
171,819,531 
3. 922 ,9&1, 695 
54,083,796 
74,695,!!01 
5. 238,314,879 
1, 398,684,573 
389,480.2lQ_ 
$3,450,149,776 
$1,&25,083,860 
1,825,065,916 
$3,450,149,776 
COMPANY A 
CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF INCOME 
FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1976 AND 1975 
Products and Servic~s Sold: 
Costs: 
Employment costs: 
Wages and salaries 
Eo1ployee benefitS 
Products and service::; bought 
Wear and exhaustion of -facilities 
Iuterest and other costa on 
}dog-term dE:bt 
State, local and miscclla&leous taxes 
Eslimated United States and foreign 
taxes on income 
Total 
Income 
Income Per Conunon Shar~ 
Dividends Declared 
On coDllllon stock ($1.80 per share in 
1976; $2.40 per share in 1975) 
1976 
$4,963,175,479 
1,835,061,152 
356,181,762 
2,191,242,914 
2,102,880,037 
290,111,256 
74,945,9b9 
149,479,549 
$4,808,659,725 
154,515,754 
$2.85 
97 501 927 
Income Reinvested in Business =$====5=7~·=0=1=3=·=8=2==7 
$4,883,208,641 
1,861,017,904 
38~,509,914 
2,250,527,818 
1,969,122,490 
296,506,123 
66,467,69!! 
l3 7.119 J. 415 
--~·000 
$4,735, 717~ 
147,491,097 
$2.72 
129,9bl,428 
$ 17~ 
\ 
\" 
COMPANY A 
SUI~Y OF FINANCIAL OPERATIONS 
Additions to Working Capital 
In com~ 
Add--Wtar and ~xhaustion of 
facilities 
Def~rred taxes on in~owe 
Proceed~ from sales and salvage of 
plant ancJ equipment 
Increases in long-term debt due after 
ont: year 
MJscell<.meout;· additions 
Total Addition~ 
D~ductions from Working Capital 
Expended foe plant and equipment 
le~s use of funds set aside in 
pt·iot· ycarl:i 
Increases in investments and long-
term rc~t:ivables 
Dividends declared on common stock 
Decreases ill L~ng-term debt due after 
vne year 
HisceJ]anuous deductions 
Total Deductions 
lNCI<EASE(LJECKEASE) lN IIORKINli 
CAPITAL 
1976 
$154,515,754 
290,111,256 
(57,920,444) 
8,363,560 
163,349,062 
558-;-419,188 
452,008,561 
----·----452,008,561 
8,809,083 
97,501,927 
117,963,038 
___!_Q. 386' 284 
--~668,893 
($128,249,705) 
ANALYSIS Of CHANGES IN WUHKING CAPITAL 
WOI<KJNG CAPITAL AT IIEGINNING OF YEAH 
Ca~.h and marketable scc:urit ies 
Ruceivdbles, le~s estimated bad debts 
luventuricti 
Note~ and accounts payable 
Other payable~ 
$697_.1_25 ,807 
44.29 3. 2 37-
( 36. 7l 7. 4 30) 
(82. 683' 583) 
(31, 790, 745) 
(21, 351 ,184) 
INCKEASE(UECI<EASE) IN WOI<KING CAPITAL 
WORKING CAPITAL AT END OF YliAI< 
(128,249,705) 
$568,906,102 
Details of Selected Items (in millions) 
lNVENTOI<IES 
Ore, lime-
stone, coal Sewi- Supplies 
coke &. nun- Finished Finished & Sundry 
ferrous metals Products Products Items 
Dec. 31, 1975 $184.5 $Jl6.6 $283.1 $139.3 
Dec. 31, 1976 $200.8 260.6 260.9 118.5 
H75 
$147,491,097 
296,506,123 
28,109.783 
7,770,575 
37,239,161 
5,164,575 
522,299,688 
514,466,353 
400,000,000 
114,466,353 
41,128,175 
129,961,428 
73,221,822 
------·-35H,]JJ~ 
§163,521 ,910 
$533,6:!3,897 
(119,815,454) 
(30,361,576) 
54,861,977 
222,407,725 
36,429,238 
163,52lt1!.Q_ 
$697,155,80~ 
------·-
Total 
Inventories 
$923.5 
840.8 
For the most part, inventories are carried at cost as determined under 
the last-in, first-out method, and the remainder is carried at cost or 
market, whichever is,lower. 
Detail~ of Selected Items (continued) 
PLANT AND EQUIPMENT 
Balance Dec. 31, 1975 
Addition~ 
Ded.:.ctions 
Balance Dec. 31, 1976 
Balance Dec. 31, 1975 
Additions 
Deductions 
Balance Dec. 31, 1976 
Land 
$116.3 
6.3 
1.4 
$121.2 
Facilities (at cost) 
Plant TransEort.a t ion 
$8,496.8 $858.1 
420.2 25.5 
122.1 17.4 
$8,794.9 866.2 
Depreciation and Depletion 
$5,097.7 
283.1 
123.9 
$5,256.9 
Transportation 
$450.5 
11.7 
14. 7 
$447.5 
~ 
$9.4 71.2 
452.0 
140.9 
$9,782.3 
Total 
$5,548.2 
294.8 
138.6 
$5,704.4 
LUNG-TERM DEBT Ours landing 
Ra~e Maturity 12-31-76 12-31-75 
Company A 
Sinking Fund Debenturt!s(Callable) 
Sinking fund Debentures(Ca1lablc) 
Sinking Fund D~bentures(Callable) 
Subordinated Debentur.,s(Callable) 
Notes Payable ** 
Lon~-Lerm lca!:ic obligations rela-
ting to Industrial Development 
4 
4~ 
7 3/4 
4 5/8 
" 
Revenue l!onds 3-5 3/8 
Hortgages & purchase money 
ob liga tlons 
Consolidated Subsidiaries 
l<ailroads Fir~t Mortgage Bonds 
Not"s payable 
Mortgages & purchase money 
obligations 
Total long-term debt 
3 
5-B 1/4 
Less a10ount due within one year 
Long-term debt due after one year 
Rate varies with prime commercial rate. 
1988 
1991 
2006 
2001 
1977-
1981 
1977-
1993 
1971 
1977-
1990 
160.7 
189.0 
150.0 
622.8 
170.0 
100.0 
8.6 
9.6 
86.4 
.8 
1,497.9 
53.8 
$1,444.1 
** Issued pursuant to agreements providing a revolving credit 
$310 million, conv~rtib1e at th" option of tht Corporation 
to a four year term loan. 
166.5 
197.7 
622.8 
220.0 
99.3 
3.0 
9.8 
116.9 
.8 
1,436.8 
38.1 
$1,398.7 
of up to 
in 1977 in-
Company A Corporation & Sub~idiary Companies 
NOTES TO FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 
Principles Applhod ·in Consolidation 
All majority owned subsidiaries are consolidated, except for those 
describ~d ·below accounted for on an equity basis and companies which 
are insignificant. 
Investments 
Investments in L-ealty, leasing and finance operation::; are carried in 
th~ cousolidaled statements at Company A's ~quity in the net assets and 
advance._s Lo such ope rat ions suwmari Zc!d as follows: 
Kealty, leasing and finance companies 
Cash, receivables and inventory 
Plant and equipotent, less depreciation 
Inveslmcnts and other assets 
Total Assets 
Less liabilities* 
Curre11t not~s aud accounts payable 
o~bt due after one year 
Other_ realty oper.<lllons 
Total 
*Includes $79.5 million and $144.5 willian 
guaranlced by Company A at December 31, 1976 
and-December H, 1975 respectively. 
(in millions) 
December 31 
.!2_~ 1975 
$172.3 
. 3 
7.7 
- 180.3 
Uti. 3 
13.8 
28.2 
35.3 
$ 63.5 
$202.2 
14.6 
6.9 
223.7 
194.0 
5.5 
--v;-:2 
38.4 
$ 62.6 
Long-term rcct!ivables and other investments, less estimated losses, in-
clude other investments of $92.0 million and $71.2 million at Decem-
ber li, 1976 and December 31, 1975 respectively. 
Those investments which represent significant ownership inten~st are 
cart· icd on the erJuity ba::; is and all otht::rs are carried at cost. Com-
pany A's e'1uity in 1976 ·and 1975 net income of companies carried on an 
cquily basis amounted to $4.8 111illion and $3.1 million, respectively, 
uhich is included in consolidated income as part of interest, dividends 
and other income. 
Securities Set Aside for Plant and Equip=nt Additions and 
Replacements 
At D"cember 31, 1976 and December H, 1975, completion of authorized 
additions to and r.epl.acements of faciliti~s required an esrimated fur-
ther <'Xpenditure of $850 million and $1,050 milllon, respectively. At 
the end of 1974, $655 million of marketable securities had been set 
aside to cove·r in part such aulhorized expenditures. During 1975, $400 
million was used for such purpose, leaving a balance of $255 million 
set aside at December 31, 1975 and Decen•ber 31, 1976. 
Stock Option Incentive Plan 
The Stock Option Incentive Plan approved by stockholders in 1964 
authorized the option and sale of up to 1,500,000 shares of common 
stock to key management employees. The option period begins on -the 
date the option is granted and ends five years thereaft~r, ~xcept in 
cas~s of death, rerirem~11t or other earlier termination. The grant-
ing of options terminated in 196~ 10 thus no mar~ than 553,725 shares 
have been or can b~ issued. In 1975, one optionee purcl1ascd 500 
shares at $36.75 p<!r shar". In 1976, no shares were purchas.;d. At 
D"cemb.or 31, 1976, 228 option""s held options to purchase 521,300 
shares at $39.625 ami $48.00 per share for a total of $20.8 million. 
Preferred Stuck 
Company A is authorized to issue 20,000,000 shares of prefcrrt:!d stuck, 
without par valut::. At December 31, 1976, none of this stuck had been 
issued . 
Pension Funding 
Company A1 s pension plan covers substantially all its employees. Pen-
sion costs are dett:rwincd by au independent actudry, based upon various 
actuarial factors and an actuarial utelhod under which both <..:urrent and 
unfunded pa:::>t service cost:::; are f4-nded over the future on a combined 
basis by payment into pension trusts. From time to time actuarial fac-
tors are adju:::>tcd in the light of actual experience; in 1976 the l..!tfect 
of a revision of the interest factor was to decrease pension costs by· 
$42.6 million. For 1976 Lhe cost of pensions amounlcd lo $62.1 mi ilion 
compared with $l04.H million in 1975. 
Wear and Exhaustion of Facilities 
For the .most part, wear and exhaustion of facilities is related to Com-
pany A's rate of operations and is computed on lhe straight-line method 
based on the guideline procedures established in 1962 by the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
Estimated United Slates riud Foreign Taxes on Income 
No provision for taxes on income is required for 1976 due principally 
to statuatory deductions associated with mineral production and invest-
ment credits and since deferred taxes provided in prior years on 
foreign subsidiary earnings exceeded the taxes on such earnings re-
patriated in December 1976 because of credits for foreign taxes paid. 
Estimated Unitt::d States and foreign taxes on income payable for the 
year 1976 of $57.9 willian are offset by deferred tax credits of a 
lik<' amount. 
The investment credits for 1976 and amortization of the pre-1968 Ln-
vcstment credits, which <.irt:! reflected in deferred taxes, reduced the 
provision by $23.5 milllon. In addition, the net effect of all timing 
differences serv~d to reduce the provision for income taxes by $34.4 
million. Such timing differences represent taxes applicable to items 
reported for tax purposes in a period different from the period in 
which they are included ln the determination of net income for finan-
cial accounting purposes. Amounts charged for wear and exhaustion of 
facilities and amounts of earnings of certain foreign subsidiaries are 
typical examples of such reporting differences. 
f-l 
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The provision for estimated taxes on income in 1975 refleccs tox dt!-
ductions associated with mineral production paywents cvmplcted in that 
y~ar and investment credits of $31.1 million. 
Tax Litigatiun 
In 1975 an unfavorable lower court deci:::iion relating tu $28 million 
claim~ for refund of 1955 excess profits tax und int~ft!$t w~~ r~versed 
by Lile U. S. Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, and remdnded to the 
District Cour-t fur trial. 'fhe Government's petition to the IJ. S. 
Supr~me Court for a review of the Court of App~als decision was de-
nied in t'ebwary 1976. A final decision in this case may affect two 
oth~r years _involving Internal Revenue claims for a maximum remaining 
tax of $90 million and approximately $95 million of interest. The 
financial statements of Company A for 1976 and prior years properly 
reflect its financial posit ion, including provision for any tax 
llabll ity which ultimately may be assessed. 
Other Items 
-----Products and Services Sold--Products and services sold include interest, 
dividends and other income of $34.9 million in 1976 and $68.8 million 
in 1975. Costs--Wages and salarit> totaltd $1,866.7 million in 1976 
and $1,896.0 million in 1975 of which $1,835.1 million and $l,86l.O 
mLllion, respectively, were included Jn costs of productti and tierviceti 
sold and the balances were charged to con:::otruction. 
Produ~..:ts and services bought reflect Ll~e cho..mges during each year in 
invcuturi~:;- and deferr~d costs. These j tems d~LI"edSt~d during 1.976 
approximately $74 rul Ilion and increased during 19 75 approximately 
$59 mill ion. 
It th~ total ut wages and salaries and products and services bought 
were ceclassified as costs of products aud services sold and general 
aJwini:;tratiVt! anc.l st:lli.ng expenses, lht! a1uounts thereof would bt! 
$3,705.5 million and $212.4 million in 197& and $1,600.8 million and 
$229.1 million in 1975 respectively. 
Maint~nance and repairs of plant and equipment totaled $651.1 million 
in 1976 and $697.8 million in 1975. 
In 1976 and 1975,_ expenditures on noncancellable charters and leases 
covering ore ships, office space and other properties totaled $56 
million and $41 million, respectively. At December 31, 1976 minimum 
rentals totaled $50 million per year, the major portion of which 
t~rminat~s within ten year$. 
ACCOUNTANTS' OPINION 
To the Stockhuldtrs of Company A 
In our opinion, tbt=! accompanying Consolidat~d Statement of Findn~L.ll 
Position and rtlated Statement of Income and Summary of Financial 
Operations prt!sent fai£"ly the position of Company A Corporation anJ 
subsidiaries at December 31, 1976 and December 31, l97S and tht rc-
·sul ts of operations and changes in working capital for each yeJr, in 
conformity with gen~raUy accepted accounting principles appl i~d un 
a consistent basis. Our exa1UnaLions of these statements were ruade 
in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards and accurJ-
ingly included such tests of the accuuntfng records and such oth~r 
auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances. 
Horner and Helper-
Certified Pu~lic Accountd(ll~ 
CO~II'ANY A -- FIVE Yt:AR SUilliAKY 
Results for Y~ar (in millions of dollarB) 
1975 1974 1973 1972 19 71 
Net Income $154.5 $147.5 $217.2 $25 3. 7 $172.~ 
*Net Income a~ a per 
cent of net sales 3.1% 3.0% 4.5% 5.5% 4.2% 
Income per share of 
COUWIOI\ stock $2.85 $2.72 $4.01 $4.69 $3.19 
Dividends p"r slwre on 
common stuck $2.00 $2.40 $2.40 $2.40 $2.40 
Year-End Data (in millions of dollars) 
Working Cavital $568.9 $697.2 $533.6 $!l75.3 $655.2 
Long-term Uebt $1444. I $1398. 7 $1434.7 $1571.3 $1200.7 
Stuckholders' Equity $3407.2 $3450.1 $343l.6 $H44.5 $3220.7 
SeleLled H.atios 
----------
Current Katio 1. 51 l.b5 1.40 1.77 l.b4 
1. sall!~ to total assets 76.90 76.21l 72.47 70.98 71.45 
:l: net iau.::ome lu net 
worth 4.41 4.27 6. 33 7.58 12.44 
Otl~!..__Q~~ 
GrosH National Product 
(in billions of do1larB) 1050.4 976.t. 930. j !165. 7 793.5 
Standard ~ PO\.H" Is Stock 
lnd"x (composite) 108.4 91.29 197.1 107.5 99.13 
Standard & Poor's Index 
(st~el) 40.02 41.36 54.71 53.33 56.21 
Company A price range 35-25 39-28 49-)2 t.5-38 50-38 
Steel Products Shipped 
(n.,t tonl::i in OOO's) 19,300 21,000 22,400 22' 500 19,800 
*Industry average during the current year i~ 2.7%. 
1-' 
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TO COMPANY B SHAREHOLDERS: 
This year was a difficult and disappointing year for Company ll people 
and for our shareholders. 
Shareholders, employees, anJ suppliers -all were hurt by the econoonic 
conditions that dtpre::ised our busint:ss throughout lhe year. The 
punishin~; impact of higher costs uf labor and material, cout>ined with 
signifi.:antly reducC!d operating levels in the latter· part of the year 
due tu lmpurted stc"l and "ar lier strike-hedge buying, held Company 
B's earnings to Lt1eir lowest levels in nin~ years. 
Although the fourth quarter results of this year were ahead of the 
fourth quurter retoults of last yeart earnJ.ngs for the full year tilipped 
to $.1.44 per share compdt . .,d to $1.64 per share last year. 
Btcausc of the continuing ~ost-prict:! squeeze. and the depresSed economyt 
this year was a year of painful decisions. To keep the company finan-
cially healthy, the cotwnon stock dividend had to be cut, management 
compl!nsation reduced, a significant nUwber of hourly and salarltd . 
employees laid off or terminated, and operating and overhead expenses 
droslically reduced. 
It it» impllcL.mt to ~mphaslze that several of Company 8 16 busin~sses 
performed extrenoely well during the year in spite uf the prublcw; of 
the economy. 
The Metal Pruducts Uivh:don, which makes construction products ranging 
from corrugated steel pip" to highway guardrail and prc-t:nginecred 
stet:! 1 Lui lding,s, ach icved sales 'and earlling!i records. The Machinery 
and l>qulpmeut Jlivision, which makes uil well drilling equipn~cnt, tubu-
lar products, oil fi~ld and indu~trial pumps, and other machinery, had 
it~ best year In 13 years. 
011r insut-ant..:~ and gcnt:ral equipment leasing businesses continued to con-
tributd: to corporat..c-earnings. These financial enterprises are now 
being condueLed as international businesses with offices in Btrmuda, 
Europe and Australia. 
These non-steel activilies helped uffset the financial impact of low 
vuiumt.! ope~:ations in our steel and advanced utaterlals businesses. 
Our forecasts indicate improved r~sults for next year. The massive 
modernization program for our steel plants, which was initiated six 
years ago, it; now virtually compltte. The much-needed ntw facilities 
arc in place and op.,rat1ng. They will help us increase our share of 
those steel wackets in which we participate. 
With the possible exception of pollution control facilities, we do not 
plan Lo uw.lertake any major new capital expenditure programs that re-
quir~ additional long-t~~m financing for at least several years. 
We also find reason for optimism in the number of new products devel-
oped by our rest!arch that are now reaching the marketplace. Through-
out its history, Company B has been abl" to d"velop and produce 
specialty materials to meet the customer's individual needs. 
Our greatest confidence in the future of Company B grows out of our 
conviction thaL the people who make up this company constitute one of 
tl1e finest business organizations in tl1e world. 
Company B's managagement accomplished significant force and cost reduc-
tions during the past two years making the "ntire organization lean and 
ready to meet Lht:! challenges of n~xt yedr. 
imports of foreign st.,el redched a new all-tim" high of 18,300,000 tons 
during this past year. This represents more thdn three tilnes the total 
steel shipments ·of Company B. Such mastolve tonnages of imports dis-
rupted markt:tS and reduced domestic shipments to their lowest level in 
t:ight years. Stainless and specialty steels were hard .. st hit, with 
imports taking as much as 65 percent of the d,1mestic busin~ss in ~oiBt! 
product lines. 
Since the majority of these imports enter this country wl th the benefit 
of subsidies from the producing country, and come from nations which 
restrict ~ntry of Aw~rican stct!l products, our government hat:i been try-
ing to neguLiat~ a new voluntary quota arrangement. This w111 limit 
shipmenLs fruw Japan and tht! Common Market l.::ountries to a reasonable 
shart! of the domestic markt!ts. 
Japan ha.::; agreed to the~e voluntary rt=strafnts. We eXlJt!l:.t tht! other 
countries to agree to a similar quota plan. If vOluntary agreement 
cannot be reached, the steel industry will ask Congress to regulate 
this onc-w<Jy tr.affic in carbon dnd stainlet:~s stt::el productt». 
The Administration's Nt:w Ecunowic Policies ~hould make nt:xt'year a 
much b~tttr bu!:iintss year than the past year. We expect that impfove-
mcnt_wil1 be gcadual·bul substantial throughout the year. 
!:ilnccrely, 
c. William Smith 
Chairman and Chief 
Executiv~ Officer 
COMPANY B CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARY CU~IPANIES 
STATEMENT OF CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL POSITION 
DECEMBER 31, 1976 and 1975 
(DOLLARS IN TIIOUSANIJS) 
ASSETS 
Current Assets: 
Cash and warketable: s~curitit!S 
Accounts and no.tes receivable 
Trade (les;; allowanc" for doubt fu1 
account» of $3,635 for 1976 and 
$3,506 for 1975) 
ou,,.r 
Inventories, at tl1e lower of cosL 
(principally I.IFO) or market 
Fini::ihed and semi-fiui~hed products 
Km.J matt.!rials and supplies 
Total Current Assets 
lnvt.."-Stments (Not.e 1) 
AL cost plus .,quJty in undistributed 
earningti 
At cost 
Property Plant aud l!qulpment--At Cost 
(Note 6) 
Land, land improvements, and leaHeholds 
Bui I ding» 
Nachiuery and equipment 
Other 
Construction in progress 
Total 
l~ss accumulated deprecl~tion 
Property, Plant & Equipment--Net 
Unamortized !.ease IUghts (Note 8) 
Excess of Cost over Equity in Net Assets 
of Purchased Businesses (Note 1) 
Prepaid Expenses and Def.,rred Charges 
Total 
19 76 
2'1,367 
210,3'•5 
33, H82 
239,4 7l 
14i, 989 
b%,053 
84,912 
36,860 
69, Sll 
24 7' 362 
1,599,247 
78,868 
__ _2b904 
2,047,893 
974,892 
1,073,001 
159,907 
12' 17 3 
21,540 
$2,044,448 
19 75 
$ 29,246 
206,431 
3 7' 642 
246,044 
l38 351 
65 7,696 
74' 718 
35,541 
63,900 
234,208 
1,474,166 
73,62'1 
--~·22Z. 
1,931,440 
928 732 
1,002,708 
175,383 
10' 322 
22,545 
1!_,_278. 913· 
·company B Corporation & Subsidiary Companies 
LIABII.ITIES AND SUAREIIOLUERS' EQUITY 
Current Liabilities: 
Notes payabl" 
Accounts payable 
Trade 
Other 
Accrued taxes 
Accru..:d salaries, wages and conunlssions 
Other act:urals 
Current portion of long-lerw deOt 
Total Current Liabilities 
Long-'l'erw Debt (Note 7) 
Long-Term !.ease Obligations (Note 8) 
Def~rred Income Taxes (Note 9) 
Other !.labilities 
Shareholders' Equity (NotE! J) 
Preferred stock--authorized 5,000,000 
shares of no par value, issuable in 
series: $2.10 cumLilativ~ convertible 
series; shdrt.!S i.ssued and outstanding 
4,031,346 in 1975, at stated value 
(involuntary liquidaLlon preference 
aggregates approximaLe1y $61,000) 
Col!lDlon stock--authoriz"d 60,000 shares 
of $5 par value each; shares out-
~tauding, 29,174,020 in 1975 
Additional paid-in capital 
Income retained tn the bu~d ne::iS 
Total Shard10lders' Equity 
Total 
1976 1975 
-----
91,830 $ 69' 336 
61,994 69,089 
21' 545 34' 533 
3 7,026 29,569 
52,639 54' 172 
24,122 29,614 
~_g~ -- 9,866 
295,489 296' 179 
3!!4 ,054 371,546 
17Y,065 186,989 
67,32Y 56,663 
SH,84J 25,155 
17,214 17,133 
146,884 145,870 
115' 542 112,239 
__ 780,(}30 767 139 
1,059,670 1,042 2 3Bl 
$2,044,448 $1 '978,2_!]_ f-' 
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COMPANY B CORPORATION AND SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES 
STATEMENT OF CONSOLIDATEU INCOME AND RETAINED EARNINGS 
FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEI'IBER 31, 1976 and 1975 
(DOLLARS IN THOUSAND~) 
Revenue~ 
Sales, less discounts, returns and 
allowances 
Royalties, dividends, interest, etc. 
Total 
Costs and Expenses 
Cost of p<oducts sold 
Selling and ad~inistrative expenses 
Interest expense 
Sund<y olhi>< (c<.,dits) - net 
Fcdend, state and foreign inco~ taxes, 
less investment tax credits of $5,815 
fo< 1~76 and $12,357 fo< 1975 (Not" 9) 
Total 
N<'t Income ot Company B Co<ponH ion and 
Consolldatt!d Subsidiarl"s 
Equity in Net Income of Unconsolidated 
Suusidlarles (Not" I) 
Net Income 
Income Retained in the Buslness-BBginning 
of Year 
Total 
L<'SS Cash Dlvid"nds Paid 
Common Stock 
Preferred Stock 
1'olal 
Income Retai-ned in tile Business--End of Yea·r 
Per Share 
CoUuuon Stack 
Income (Note 2) 
Dividends 
Pr~[.,rred Stock--Dividends 
--~ IY75 -~----
$1,696,169 $1, 5!l3,67J 
-~ 17,540 __ ____!__7__,___: 
1, 713,709 1,600,989 
1,463,903 1,362,844 
145,601 137,527 
33,576 2 7. 925 
(2,162) (943) 
--~-~798 21,412 
_ _!,667. 7!6 1,548,765 
45.991 5:l,Zl4 
---~~ ---~3~,929 
50,711 56,153 
-~~~__!__.:!2_ -~~2 
- 817,850 822,028 
29. 325 46,435 
--8,495 -~-8,454 
__ 3~820 ~889 
7tl0,030 $ 767,139 
$ 1.44 $ 1.64 
1.00 1.60 
2.10 2.10 
COtti'AtlY B CORPOMTION AND SUBSIDIARY COHPAN!ES 
STATE.'ILNT IJF CHANGES lH COtiSOLIUATED FINAtiCIAL POSITION 
FOR TilE YEARS ENDED DECENllEK 31, 1976 AN!l 1975 
(DOLLARS IN TllOUSANilS) 
Operations 
Net incmnc for the ye.:.r 
Deprt'ciation 
Lt~as~ r i gilt amortization 
Deft=-rrell income taxet:i 
Equity in net income of unc.onsolidat~d 
~ub::iidiaries 
Total 
Proceeds from debentures and long-term 
notes payable 
Increase in other 1lubi1ltles 
Increase in current notes payable 
Uecreas~ (in,:reaSt!) in inventories 
Other--net 
Total 
1976 
-----
50.711 
70,575 
15,146 
10,884 
(4,718) 
142,598 
39.720 
33,686 
22,494 
1, 9 )I, 
6,539 
56,153 
66,033 
13,981 
7,955 
-- (3, 929) 
140,193 
2 33,848 
3,9ZJ. 
25,888 
(25,379) 
-~ 382.914 ~~ ----~ 
Capital expenditures 
·Cash dividends 
Payments on long-term debt 
Decrease (increase) i11 accounts payable 
and accruals 
Payments on long-term lease obligations 
Increase (decrease) in investments 
Increase in accounts and notei receivable 
Total 
INCREASE (llECRJ::ASE) IN CASH AND HARKETABLE 
SECURITIES 
Cash and Marketabl~ s~curities 
lleginning of year 
End or year $ 
14'•.900 U!2, 899 
37,820 54,889 
32,732 149. 59 7 
17,456 (5,088) 
6,975 5,900 
6, 795 o. 318) 
172 ~__121<_ 
246 850 407 033 
121 (24,1H) 
29 246 53 365 
29 t 36 7 $~ 
Company B Corporation & Subsidiary Companies 
FINANCIAL SUMHARY 
Su~nary of Accounting Policits (Not~ l) 
Principles of Consolidation 
The a~companying consolidated financial statements include the ac£..:ounts 
of all sub.sidiary companies except lea~dng and insurance compani~s. In-
ve~tments in subsidiary ·cornpanie::; nut ~onsolidalcd and in 50% owned curu-
panies~are stated at cost plus equity in undl~tribt&ted ·earnings since 
acquisition, which is Company B's equity in their net assets; .. u other 
inve:~tments an~ stated at cost. 
Accounting fur Acquisitions 
Uuring 1976, Company B purchased the net assets and business of a com-
pany in exchange for 199,995 shares of common stock. 
fn 1975, Company B acquirt::d the n.et asset::; and buSiues::;e::; of three cow-
panic::; in exchange fur 258,81~ shares of cumtnon stock. One of Lhc 
<h..:(luisitious was accounted for as o pooling uf fnter~sts and the others, 
which did nut qualify for that methou of accountin!l, wer.e accounted for 
as pucclmscs. 
TI1ese acquisitions l1ad no ma(crial ~ffect on consolid~ted fia1at1clal 
position or rtsulLs of operations in ~itber year. 
Translation of Foreign Currencies 
The accounts of foreign subsidiarit:::s have been translated frow local 
currenL:ies into United States dollars as follows: monetary as!:H!ts and 
liabilities at current exchange ratt::.s; nonmont!tary assets and liubili-
tie~ at historical rates; incomt:! accounts primarily at the av~rage ex-
change rate~- for the period, except that depreciation charges have been 
translatt.J at the exchangL: ratt!s prevailing· when tht. as!:ietS· were ac-
quin~d. The translation of foreign cur.reucy ba]ances resulted in a net 
debit adju~tment of $983,000, of which $823,000 has been deferred to be 
an1ortized over future periods. 
Depreciation Pol icy 
Depreciation is calculated on the straight-line method designed to 
amortize the cost of various classes of depreciable a~sets over their 
estimated useful lives. Leasehold costs are amortized over the shorter 
of the life of the related asset or Lhc life of the lea~e. 
(o\>r federal income tax purposes, accelerated methods of depreciation are 
used and deferred income taxes are pcoyided on the difference between 
the depreciation expense for financial accounting purposes and that for 
in~..:ome tax. purposes. 
Excess of Cost over Equity in Net A.sstr~ of Purchastd Businesses 
In consolidation, $12,173,900 at DeLember 31, 1976 and $10,322,000 at 
December 31, 1975 have been classified as excess of cost over equity in 
net assets of purchased businesses. Couunencing in 1976, such amounts 
are being amortized over th~ estimated· future periods to b~ benefitted. 
Computation of Income per Share 
Income per share of common ~tack is determined lly dividing the weighted 
average number of share~ of ·'-.:ammon stot:.k outst.anding during each year 
into net incom" less dividends on -the $2.10 preferred stock. Common 
stock equivalents and sllareti issuable contingent upo11 future earnings 
have no material dilutive effect on income per shan~. 
Net Income ami Dividends (Note 2) 
Net Income of Company B and sut.Jsidiary companies for the year eiu.Jed 
Det..:ember 31~ _1976, amounted to $50,711,000, or $1.44 per share uf couunon 
stock. For 1975, th" company eanwd $56,153,000, or· $1.64 per shure of 
common .stuck. 
Cash dividends paid on conuuoo ~tack during 1976 amounted to $1.00 per 
share as compared to $1.60 per share in 1975. Divide11ds on the .preferred 
stock were paid at the $2.10 rate in 1976 and 1975. 
Shareholders 1 Equity (No to= _j) 
$2.10 Cumulative Convertible Preferred Stock--Th~ number of sharc.s uf 
$2.10 prefer~ed stock outstanding increased from 4,031,346 shares at 
llecember 31, 1975 to 4,050,296 shares at December 31, 1976. At those 
respective date::;, 106.575 and 74,700 share~ were r~serv~d for issuant..:e 
to oprion.ees for outstanding stock options. The preferred stuck has the 
following rights: annual dividends at the rate of $2.10 are cumuJatlvt! 
whether or not earned, and each share is entitlt:!d Lo one vott! and is 
convertible into .85 shares of Company IS's conunon .stock. The $2.10 pre-
ferred stock may he r~dtemed by Company B at any tim~:: aft-e£ Jauuary l, 
1980 for $40 a shar~ plu~ any accrued but unpaid divid~nds. 
Curumon Stock--The shares of common stock out.standing amounted to 
29,376,824 at Deco=mber 31, 1976 and 29,174,020 at December 31, 1975. 
The number of shares outstanding is after deducting 415.663 shares and 
618,467 shares held in treasury at those respective dates. lluring 1976, 
the company Jssu~d 1.99,995 treasury shares to acquire a company and 
2, 799 treasury shar-es in connection with the acquisition of 2.360 
.. founders shares of C01npany ll Leasing Corporation ... 
At De_ceotber 31, 1976 and 1975, shares of common stock amounting to 
3,506,2~7 and 3,517,233, re~pectively, were reserved for conver~ion of 
$2.10 preferred stoLk and 501,080 and 778,230, resp~ctlvely, were re-
served for issuance to optiunees for outstandiog stock options. Also, 
at those dates, 212,000 and· 132,000 5hares of common stock, respectively, 
were- reserved for issuance contingent upon future earnings of certain 
acquired ·companies. 
Company B Leasing Corporation has outstanding 42.,640 11 founders shares: 11 
of common stock which, under a Stockholders' Agr(;!emc:nt providing tor 
th~ acquisition thereof by Company 8, have specific r~strictions on 
their transferability, SC£l!o!, and equity rJghts. Company B will acquire 
appruximalely one-fiflh of such shar~s in each o-f the five year!:> be-
ginning in 1977 in exchange for its corrunon stock un the basis of an 
exchangl.! ratio dcvtdoped from the taL-nings per ~il<1rc of Company B L~as­
ing Curporalion and Company B for the second calendar year prect:!ding 
the year of l!Xchange. The 1977 -.rate of exchange, cumputt:J Lube 2.6787 
sharcl:i of Comp<wy B CIJmmon stot.:k in exchange for one 11 found..:.rs share" 
of cummou ~lock, i~ presently being disputed by sume: holder=:; of founders 
shan,s, Since the ralio of exchange for 1971l-1981 will b..: determined by 
a comparison of future income per .share, the number uf Company B shares 
tube i~~ut!J iu tho.sc years is not presently dcterminuble. 
Add,ltional l'aid-Iu Capital--Additional paid-in ·capital incr.,as..:d during 
1976 from $112,239,00() to $115,542,000 as a result of credits arising 
from (a) the ~xcc.ss of market valut! ovt:r the par value of com111on stoc_k 
i:isueJ in counectlon with thL' cH.:quisition of a cornvany ($3,000,000), (b) 
the L!Xt:es::; of proceeds over stated value of preferred ::)tack issued under 
stock O!Jtion plans ($293,000), and (c) miscellaneous treasury stock 
tran,;actlons ($10,000). During 1975, additional paid-in capital in-
cr.,ased from $10!1,930,000 to $112,239,000 as a r"sult of net credits 
from the Hum of (a) tht! excess of warkt!t valu~ over the par value of 
cunuuon stuck issued to purduJ.s~ two companies ($2,678,000) amJ for ln-
l·cntivc Compcusation Plan stock award.s ($564,000) a~d (b) the excess- of 
vroc~eds LlV~r stated value of !)referred ~luck issued under stock option 
pLHl!:i ($/8,000), less (c) misc.ellau.euus tr~a.'iury stock transactions 
($11,000). 
Iocowc Rt:!talned ln the Busines~--Consol ida ted income. retained in the 
bu~incss at December 31, 1976 amot~nted to $71l0,030,000 cumpared with 
$767,11Y,OOO at Deceu~er 31, 1975. Under restrictive provisions of the 
credit agrcemcut mentioned under Long-Tenu Debt, $80,000,000 of income 
retained in the busioes~ at Dec.eruber 31, 1976 was availahle for declara-
tion of ca!::>h dividends and payment on accouul of the purchase, acquisi-
tion. ccdcm:ptlUn or other rclit-emenl of t:..J.pit.:_d st~_~k. 
Uc.scription uf Stock 
$2.10 Cumulative Convertible 
Prderr<!d Stock 
Options outstanding 
December 31 
1976 
19 75 
Optiuns exercised 
1976 
19 75 
Number 
o( Shares 
74,700 
106,575 
18,950 
11,948 
Option Price 
Per Share 
$20.63 - 47.75 
5.50- 47.75 
5.50 - 25.38 
5.63 - 22.72 
Common Stock Number Option Price 
Options outstanding of Shares Per Share 
December 31 
Qualified 
1976 493, ijQO 16.75- 30.4 7 
19 75 496,900 20.25- 30.4 7 
Nonqualified 
1976 501,01l0 16.75 - )0 .4 7 
1975 500,030 20.25 - 30.47 
Options granted 
Qualifid 
19 76 Ll,OOO 16.75- 20.19 
19 75 152,300 20.25 30.4 7 
Nonqualified 
1976 21,000 16.75- 20.19 
1975 153,030 20.25- 26.lJO 
The options to purchase $2.10 cumulative convertible preferred stock were 
granted in years 1970 through 1974 and wlll become eKerciBable in varying 
amounts through August 4. 1978. 
'fhe Conunon Stock Option Plan was adopted by the ~hareholders of Company 
Bon April 17, 1974. This plan provides generally for the granting of 
both qualifi"d and nonquallfied options to purchase couunun stock, not to 
exceed 1,000,000 shares in the aggregaLe, at a purchase price of not 
Jess than 100% uf tht: m..JI·kcl pric~ of Company B1 ::i common stock on the 
date the option is granted. Optionl!es way exercise 25% (cumulatively) 
of their options after each of the next four annlv.ersarJ.es of the date 
of the grant. With th~ exl:eption of stock options for 3,130 shares, 
qualified and nonqualificd ~tuck options under the !'lao have be"n granted 
on a 11 matchlng11 basis--that is, granted for the same number of share~ to 
the ~amt! optionee generally at the sarne time and at the sam~ pric~. 
Under specified conditions, an optionee may e1.,ct to eKercis" eith"r his 
qualJ f i~d or nunqualif ied opt ion; subject • however, to the lirni tat ion 
that to the extent a 11matching option" is exercised, the ot.her (unless 
it has expired) will b" reduced in a' like amount. Subject to earlier 
termination under certain ~unditions_, qualified options granted under 
thl~ plan expire five years after the dat" of the grant and nonqualified 
options t;!Xpire Len year!:> after the datt of the gt·ant. No options tu 
purchase conuuon stock were exercised in 1976 anJ 1975. 
Foreign Subsidiarie~ (Note 5) 
Financial data relating to Company B's investment in foreign subsidiaries 
consolidated are presented below: 
Net Sales 
Net Income 
Net Current Assets 
Properties, less depreciation 
Total 
Other Liabilities 
Net Assets 
1976 
$2 30--:695.000 
8,389,000 
62,379,000 
61' 784 ,_QQQ 
124,163,000 
10,222,000 
$113,941,000 
1975 
$218,763,000 
12,497,000 
62,109,000 
57,420,00()_ 
119,529,000 
16,952,000 
$102,577,000 
Properti~s and D~preciatiou (Note 6) 
Expenditures for property, plant and equipment during 1976 amounted to 
$144,900,000 as compard with $182,899,000 during 1975. In addition 
to amounts expended by Company B, $2,836,000 in 1976 and $15,962,000 in 
1975 was expendeJ by municipalities for facilities to be leased by Com-
pany B upon completion of construction (st!e Lung-Tet·m Lease~). 
Depreciation expense amounted to $70,575,000 for 1976 as compared with 
$66,033,000 for 1975. 
Long-Term Debt (Note 7) 
Long-term debt at December 31, less current maturities and amounts in 
treasury, was as follows: 
Sinking Fund Uebcntures: 
8.7% due 2000; annual sinking fund of 
$5,000,000 commencing in 1982 
5.9% due 1997; annual sinking fund 
of $3,000,000 collllllencing in 19!10 
4.35% due 1989; annual sinking fund 
of $J, 750,000 
4.5% due 1991;· annual sinking fund 
of $2,500,000 
7. 25:t" Guaranteed Debentures, due 
19!15; annual sinking fund of 
$750,000 in 1977, $1,250,000 
in 1978-1981, $2,ooo,ooo in 
19!!2-19!14 and $2,500,000 in 
1985 
Notes Payablc--8.25%, due 1980 
Notes Payablc--7.875%, due 2001, 
annual payments ·of $1,750,000 
commencing in 1983 
~~vulving Credit Notes 
Other 
Total 
19 76 
$100,000,000 
60,000,000 
45,000,000 
35,000,000 
13,500,000 
50,000,000 
29,500,000 
15,000,000 
~~...Ql~OOO 
~~.QQQ 
1975 
$100,000,000 
60,000,000 
48,750,000 
37,500,000 
14,250,000 
50,000,000 
30,000,000 
-- 31,046,000 
$]71,546,000 
Linder the terms of a credit agreement with a group of banks, Company B 
way borrow un a rt!VOIVing credil. basis, up to $150,000,000 at the prime 
commercial rate of the banks on the dates of borrowings. Loans up to 
such maximum awount arc convertible into term loans on December 31,1979 
with inter.,st of 1/2 of 1 percent above the prime cmomercial rates. 
Such loans would mature in stipulated annual amounts through 1983. 
During the five years ending December 31, 1981, maturiti<'s (after giv-
ing effect to amounts held in treasury and assuming conversion of the 
outstanding Revolving Credit Notes to terw loans) of long-t.,t·w debt 
will Leas follows: 1977, $6,333,000; 1978, $14,123,000; 1979, 
$12,259,000; 1980, $70,149,000; and 1981, $15,844,000. 
Long-Term Leases (Not.e 8) 
Company H has entered into lease agre~ments for the use of facilities 
that have been or are being constructed with funds provided from the 
proceeds ($203,900,000) of Industrial R<>venue Bonds. The lease agree-
ments provide for the payment in annual amounts ($16,000,000 in 1977, 
and In generally dcc~easing annual amounts to approximately $14,000,000 
in 1985 through 1996 and approximately $7,000,000 in 1997 and 1998) 
sufficient to service principal and interest (combined effective rate 
of approximately 4.8%) on ti1e bonds. Amounts, which comprehend 1"ase 
rights, cq~ivalent to the aggrt!gate lease payments generally are being 
amortized and chargt:!J to income on a straight line basis over tht: 
l!Stimated productive lives of the facilitie:i, which for the most· pure 
are shorter than the terms Of the lt:!ases. Company H has options to 
purchase tht! facilities at any rime during the terw of tht: leases at 
the scheduled redemption pi-ices of the bonds or for nominal iimounts at 
the end of the lease pt!I:"iods. Unamortized lease rights as shown in thl' 
st~temt:nt of consolidated financial position at December 31, 1976 and 
1975, respt!ctively, include $6,025,000 and $12,l39,000 of re•uaining 
proceeds h~ld by trustees. 
lncome Taxes (Note 9) 
The provision for incomt!' taxes consists of: 
Current 
Feder a 1 - Net 
State and Foreign 
Total 
Deferred - Net 
Total 
1976 
$ 6,175,000 
9, 739 ,ooo· 
15,914,000 
~4,000 
$26,798,000 
I 975 
$ 3,565,000 
9,892,000 
13,4 57.000 
~.ooo 
$21,412,000 
Company B fill!S a consolidated federal income tax return which includes 
the domestic leasing and insur..lnCt!' companies that are ilDt consolidated 
for financial statement purpost!s and utilizes in Jts tax return its 
shar~ of operating costs of Re:d Mining Company (see Coarunitmcnts and Con-
tiilgencicb) incl1~lng the depreciation, amortizdtion, depletion aJtd in-
vestment tax crPdits. attributable to the properties at Red Mining Co. 
1'he provision for curr~nt income taxes has been reduced in e:ach year by 
items such as foreign tax credits, allowance for percentage depletion 
and dividend exclusions. The provision for deferred income taxes as 
shown above consists principally of the tax effect of the difference be-
tween Company B's depreciation and lease expenses for financial account-
ing purposes and for income tax purposes, less (a) reversal of tht- tax-
effect of the difference, accumulated in prior years, between Company 
B's share of Red Mining Company's depreciation and amortization expenses 
for financial accounting purpvses and for income tax purposes, (b) in-
vestm.ent tax credits of $5,815,000 for 1976 and $16,244,000 for 1975 
carried forward to future years and (c) for 1976, fureign tax credits of 
$5,000,000 'carri~d forward to future years. The deferred income taxe.l:i 
shown in the accompanying statement of consolidated financial pm;ition 
1--' 
N 
CXl 
ar~ compristd principally of the cumulative eff~ct of the above it~ms, 
which at December 31, 1976, included investment tax credits of 
~22,000,000 and foreign tax credits of $5,000,000 carried forward to 
b~ used in federal income tax returns. 
Penciion Plans (Not" lU) 
Company Rand certain of its subsidiaries have in effect sevet·al pen-
sion plans covering substantially all of their employees. Pensi011 
costs (J~fined dS normal cost plus interest on unfunded past service 
costs and, if required, an amount for vested b~nefits) are fund~d. 
Income fur 1976 was charged wlth $25,275,000 as compared with 
~25,101,000 in 1975. Based upon actuarial estimates, the total amount 
required at December 31, 1976 tu provide fully for past service cost 
was $521,324,000. At that date the unfunded past service cost of the 
jJ1anH amounted tu <>pproxl1uatcly $138,605,000. At January 1, 1976, 
the date of the latest actuarial determination, the assets of the 
pensiuu funds exceeded vested benefits under tht! plans. 
Thrift Pldn fur Salatlt!d Employees (Note ll) 
Under the tenus of the Thrift Plan for Salaried Employees, 570,037 
shares of the cumpany 1 s common stock were purchased during the year by 
the tru!itee. Thrift Plan shares are allocated to partici_pating eau-
ployees and are held in trust by the trustee. Company B's contribution 
to this plan au1ount"d to $3,036,000 in 1976 and $2,967,000 in 1975. 
Such contribution repr~sentcd 50 cents fur each dollar invested by the 
participants. 
Couuuitm.,nts and Contingencies (Note ll) 
In connection with the debt financing of Company B Leasing Corporation. 
Company B has agreed to cause Company B Lcas·ing to maintain working 
capit~l (aci defined) of not less than $1,000,000 and equity (as defined) 
of not less than $5,000,000. 
Company B and the other 50% shareholders of Red Mining Company are ob-
ligated, until the outstanding principal amount of first mortgage bonds 
(Series A, $73,591,000; Series B, $61,920,000) of R"d ~lining Company ls 
paid in full, to take the entire production of Red Mining Company, and, 
as tu each half-owneL"", to pay 50% of Red's operating and intet""est costs. 
If and to the extent that Red shall not have made the necessary paym~nts 
each shareholder is also obligated to pay one-half of amounts nt:!eded by 
Red for (a) fixed sinking. fund requirements and final rna tur ity amount 
on the said bonds, and (b) t..:ertain future capital replacements. Sepa-
rate financial stat~ments for l<.ed are included in reports filed 
annually with the Securities and Exchangt! Conunission. 
Company B is similarly obligated up to approximately $3,800,000 under 
arrangements with another associated company in which a 5.87% interest 
is held. 
At December 31, 1976, Company B was guarantor of ~72,000,000 of debt 
issued by a company for use in constructing production facilities and 
operating a nickel mining venture in which Company B has a 17.5X 
interest. 
Commitments for the purchase of prop~rty, plant, and equipment (in-
cluding unexp~nded aa!ouuts .relating to projects substantially under 
way) amounted to ~66,000,000 at December 31, 1976. 
ACCOUNTANT'S OPINION 
To Company B, its Shareholders and Directors: 
We have examined Lhe statt:!ruent of consolidatt:d financial position of 
Company B and subsidiary companies as of Decemb~r 31, 1976 and 1975 
and the related statements of consolidated income retained in the busi-
ness and changes in consolidated financial position for· the years then 
ended. We have also examined the combined statement of findncial 
position of the unconsolldat.,d subsidiaries of Company B as of December 
31, 1976. and 1975 and the related combined statemt:nls of income and 
changes in financial position for the years then ended. Our examina-
tions were madt! in accordance with generally acct::pted auJ.iting staw.Ltrds 
and accordingly included Slu..:h tests of the accounting records and such 
otl1er auditing procedur~s as we considered necessary in the circum-
stances. 
In our oviniun, th~ at..:companying financial statemt;!nts pres~nt fail-ly 
the financial position of Company B and subtddiary companies and of the 
unconsolidated subsidiari<'S of Company B at DecemLer 31, 1976 and 1975 
and their respectiv~ results of operations and changt!s in financial 
position for the years then e.nd~d. in conformity with gc.n~rally 
accepted accounting principles applied on a consistent bdsis. 
Starks and Sh~rman 
c~rtifi~d Public AcCOUiltants 
COHPANY B -- FIVE YEAR SUHHARY 
Results t"r Y"ar (in millions of dollars) 
N~t Inc0m~ dS a per 
c~11t ui 11et sal~s 
lncomC! pt:r .::;har~ of 
commun stu..:k 
DiviJet1ds per til1are 011 
cuc}(l.l.Jtl Stock 
3.0% 
$1.44 
$1.00 
1974 
$56:"2 
3.5% 
$1.64 
$1.60 
1973 
$"""""95."7 
6.1% 
$3.01 
$1.575 
y.,a,~End Data (in millions of dollars) 
Wurking t:apital 
Long-c~rm_ Debt 
Stocldw1dcrs' Equity 
St!l~ctt>J Ratios 
Current R.p.tio 
% sal~s to total assets 
% net iucorne to net 
wurth 
Other Data 
Gross Natit;nal Product 
$360.6 $361.5 $377.9 
$384.1 $371.5 $293.1 
$1059.7 $1042.4 $1036.3 
2.22 2.22 2.50 
1!2.96 .80.02 84.80 
4.79 5.38 9.23 
(in billions uf dollar:;) 1050.4 976.4 930.3 
Standard ~ l'oor 1 s stot.:k 
lnJ"x (cowp.:.site) 108.4 91.29 197.1 
Standurd ~ Pour's lndex 
(sL.,el) 40.02 41.36 54.71 
Company H price range 23-15 29-18 33-25 
Stet:l Products Shippt.:d 
(net ton• in GOO's) 5353 5442 5479 
*Industry av<•ra~" dudng the curr.,nt year is 2. 7%. 
1972 
$"""""95."0 
6.4% 
$2.96 
$1.50 
$36l.O 
$246.7 
$91J6.6 
2.76 
87.24 
9.63 
805.7 
107.5 
53.33 
59-45 
5506 
1971 
$76":0 
5.6% 
$2.29 
$1.50 
$399.9 
$271.8 
$951.5 
3. 1 7 
82.16 
7.04 
793.5 
99.13 
56.21 
58-46 
4915 
APPENDIX C 
FAVORABLE AND UNFAVORABLE POLLUTION 
DISCLOSURE USED AS EXPERIMENTAL 
VARIABLES IN THE FOUR 
TREATMENT GROUPS 
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ADEQUACY OF 
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LEGEND: 
N Noncompliance with environmental standards. 
C ~ Compliance with environmental standards, 
Based on EPA estimates of the steel industry pollution control bill, 
Company A would have to spend $682 million during the next five years 
to bring its plants ·into camp liance with pollution control regulations. 
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LEGEND; 
N Noncomplianc~ with environmental standards. 
c = Compliance with environmental standards. 
Based on EPA estimates of the steel industry pollution control bill, 
Company A would have to spend $45.5 million during the next five years 
to bring its plants into compliance with pollution control regulations. 
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LEGEND: 
N Noncompliance with environmental standards. 
C = Compliance with environmental standards. 
Based on EPA estimates of the steel industry pollution control bill, 
Company B would have to spend $45.5 million during the next five years·. 
to bring its plants into compliance with pollution control regulations. 
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LEGEND: 
N Noncompliance with environmental standards. 
C ; Compliance with environmental standards. 
Based on EPA estimates .of .. the steel industry pollution control bill, 
Company B would have to spend $682 million during the next five years 
to bring its plants into compliance with pollution control regulations. 
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Now that you have examined the financial statements, how much of the 
$100,000 do you choose to invest in: 
Company A $ ________ _ 
Company B $ ________ _ 
TOTAL $ 100;000 
Please answer the following questions: 
1. Are you: (Check one) 
A. An undergraduate student 
-----
B. a graduate student 
-------
C. not a student 
---------------
2. Are you usually employed? 
sider yourself employed). 
A. full time 
------
B. part time 
-------
(If you are on leave of absence con-
(Check one) 
C. not employed 
---
(If not employed, skip to Question 4). 
3. What is your occupation? 
4. What additional information, if any, would you like available for 
evaluating these reports? 
5. Besides the information furnished you, what additional information, 
if any, did you use in evaluating these reports? 
6. If your investment objective was for a period other than 5 years, 
would you have allocated the $100,000 differently? 
Yes * No 
----- ~-----
*If answer is "yes", please explain.why. 
7. How much time did you spend on your investment decision? 
8. Please fill in your social security number. 
APPENDIX E 
POST INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
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POST INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please list the information you used (from the experimental display 
provided you) in making your allocation of the $100,000 between the 
two companies. Assign weights to each unit of information used. 
Total weight should equal 100. 
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